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Abstract
Describing God
The philosophical difficulty with reiigious discourse centers around 
the problem of applying descriptive predicates to a  transcendent God. This 
is contrsuy to most contemporary accounts of the problem of religious 
language which daim that the problem is within the peculiar genres of 
reiigious language, i.e., analogy, metaphor and narrative.
The first few chapters of this dissertation examine traditional 
explanations of the problem of reiigious discourse and finds them to be 
inadequate for a  variety of reasons. The traditional explanations are either 
founded on a problematic metaphysical system or they are internally 
inconsistent.
The final two chapters look to metaphor and narrative as answers to 
the problem of predication. Neither is found to solve the problem and the 
notion of predicative history is introduced as a way of understanding the 
application of descriptive predicates to God.
Chapter 1: Introduction
Traditional philosophy of religion has been dominated by the “big 
questions." Phiiosophers have asked questions about the nature of evii, the 
existence of God and the relationship of theism to philosophical disciplines 
iike epistemology and ethics. While these big questions have not 
disappeared, the more common questions in contemporary phiiosophy 
have to do with linguistic problems in speaking about God. For some, and 
probably most, theists, speaking about God is generally not difficult; they 
just do it. Then they wonder why philosophers have such a  problem with 
their utterances. For phiiosophers such ianguage is fraught with problems. 
These problems may be summarized by the following question: How can 
humans speak meaningfully about a  transcendent God? As John Grimes 
notes, “The problem is to explain how ordinary day-to-day ianguage, which 
exists and lives in and forms the world of individuals and objects, may be 
used meaningfully to refer to this trans-human reality.”^  John Hick observed, 
“It is evident even to the most preiiminary reflection that the words 
traditionally used to describe God, such as “good," “living," “just," wise,” and 
“powerful," are not meant in their religious context to bear the sense that 
they have in their application to human beings.”^
The difficulties that Grimes and Hick describe are different For 
Grimes, the problem is one of reference. If one is speaking of a  
transcendent being, how can we say that our words refer to that being? If 
reference occurs, it would seem that one must have some access to that 
being. Yet, if a being is wholly transcendent can one be said to have any 
access at all to that being? This is the reference problem. For Hick, the 
issue is to determine how words like “good” and “just," which are 
understood when applied to human beings, apply to God, a being not 
understood. While the problems that Grimes and Hick are interested in are 
related, they are not identical. For Grimes the concern is reference; for Hick 
it is what I will call predication—how do mundane predicates succeed in 
describing God?
Religious language, for Hick, is about a  peculiar business. Religious 
language attempts to describe a God who is fundamentally different from 
human beings and the physical world by using terms which are descriptive 
within that physical world.
“God” and mystery
One of the reasons that speaking about God presents such 
problems is that the word 'God', in some senses, demarcates the edge of
human language. Because ‘God’ denotes so many absolutes (goodness,
power, justice, wisdom, being, etc.) it stands on the frontier of language.
The mistake is to think that the word ‘God’ either falls well within the edges 
of ianguage, where religious claims about God would be meaningful but 
would appear to be false, or else lies outside ianguage altogether. It seems 
evident to me now that the word never had much life in either of these 
foreign soils. Planted in its own ground, however, right on, and marking, 
the boundary of ianguage, the word can be as alive and flourishing today 
as in the past. If saying “God” is an acknowledgment that one has come to 
the end of ianguage, if it is a religious way of indicating that one longs to 
say ail that could possibly be said on some matter of great concern, then 
that is a role which lies just barely but legitimately within our language.^
For the Christian tradition, the complicated notions of trinity, absolute 
goodness, omnipotence and etemity are packed inside this word. Perhaps 
it does stretch language, but, more than that, it is a word which demands an 
epistemic, metaphysical and ethical accounting. Most philosophers and 
theologians mean more by ‘God’ than just the very edge of language. It is, 
for most people, more than just a  “boundary-marker”^  at the very edge of 
the frontier of language. Perhaps it stands as a  “boundary-marker” because 
it is not dear whether the term God’ refers to anything at ail. Perhaps it is a  
“boundary-marker” because it daims to label something that is 
transcendent. Whatever Van Buren means by ‘frontier" and “boundary- 
marker,” he is right that it is a word with enormous import and one which 
carries considerable linguistic difficulties.
Perhaps what Van Buren means by saying that ‘God’ stands as a
boundary-marker at the edge of language is something like saying that it is
a title which creates significant meaning problems for those ianguage users
who invoke the title. The term ‘God’ can provoke a  stimulating philosophical
dialogue, but is not of primary interest in this dissertation. Discussions
about the word God’ center around such questions as: is God’ a  proper
name? is God’ an honorific title? What functions does the term God’ have
within our language structure? is God’ an abstract singular term iike
‘wisdom,’ ‘justice,’ or goodness’? Each of these questions is worthy of
philosophical consideration.
How should a  philosophical study of ianguage about God’ approach
these matters? Perhaps the starting point is the recognition that ‘God’ plays
vital, perhaps irreplaceable, roles in ianguage. According to Gordon
Kaufman, God’ is a  central word in the English language.
It is a word In ordinary and everyday English, to be found In every 
dictionary and known and understood by every speaker of the language. It 
is imprinted on our coins and uttered as part of the pledge of allegiance; it 
appears In casual oaths as well as desperate cries for help; it carries 
overtones of value and meaning and significance for Ignorant and cultured, 
secular and believing, alike, whether it is thought to designate that reality 
most surely to be believed In, or that superstition most certainly to be 
repudiated. "God” Is a word that all Westerners know and understand, one 
of the most momentous and weighty In our language; it Is a word that has 
helped move men to the vilest of crimes as well as the most Inspired acts 
of devotion and self-giving.^
The importance of the term God' may be seen, I think rightly, as one 
for theologians to argue about For our purposes, it is enough to recognize 
the centrality of the word in Western culture. A word that is so central to 
human language and thought merits philosophical analysis.
While this paper recognizes the import of the term ‘God’ in our 
vocabulary, it will focus on the linguistic problem of God-not the term ‘God’, 
but the philosophical problem inherent in predicating attributes of God as a 
divine being. For purposes of illuminating this problem, we shall not spend 
energy on an analysis of the term ‘God’ or on the question of reference, but 
devote the remainder of this dissertation to the question of predicating 
attributes of God. It will be assumed that the word God’ does refer (i.e., 
there is an existing being to whom the word God’ refers). How this 
reference occurs will be left as an open question.
The challenges of meaningfully describing God demand analysis 
and illumination. The proper role of the philosopher of religion is to balance 
the theologian’s appeal to mystery with proper reasoned investigation. The 
theologian may assert that a transcendent God is mysterious; the 
philosopher is not allowed the luxury of such assertions. His fundamental 
task is to discover the proper role of mystery in the discussion. Can one 
speak tenably of the mystery, or must one remain silent? How can one
speak of the mystery that is God? D.Z. Phillips notes that "Our philosophical
task Is to let the concept of mystery come In at the right place; to show how
the concept Is mediated In human life.”* If theologians Invoke mystery as a
strategy to avoid charges of meaninglessness In their God-talk, then the
concept of mystery only clouds the discussion of discourse about God and
serves an antl-phllosophlcal role.
The concept of mystery, however, can be useful If one means to say
that God cannot be completely understood and that philosophical analysis
has limitations. The characteristics/properties of God which human agents
cannot understand Is then the mystery. Few theologians or philosophers
would argue that God can be completely understood; therefore, mystery
refers to the set of questions that He outside of philosophical or scientific
analysis. While mystics may write of the content of the mystery, rational
tools of explanation-the tools of philosophers and sdentlsts-are not
appropriate. Some Intellectual circles exclude the concept of mystery.
The philosophical task of the philosopher of religion Is made difficult
by the Intellectual climate of the day, a climate that Is not receptive to
religious utterances. Utterances which attempt to approach the mystery are
automatically considered meaningless. Phillips continues by noting:
In endeavoring to give perspicuous representations of the grammar of 
religious belief, the philosopher cannot take his audience for granted. I 
have already mentioned the anti-religious sense of intellectual superiority
by which he will be confronted. This sense is destroyed at considerabie 
cost to the phiiosophers concerned. They wouid have to recognize that 
they are often in the grip of the very superstitions they condemn in others, 
it is difficult to clarify the grammar of religious belief in a pervasively secular 
age/
What Phillips calls the "grammar of religious belief is not entirely dear. He 
most likely did not intend to say that religious belief uses a different 
grammatical structure than other domains of discourse, but that particular 
issues haunt religious discourse which are not relevant to other modes. The 
remainder of this dissertation will deal with the peculiar difficulty in speaking 
about God, primarily the difficulty in predicating attributes of God. 
Predication is the major, and neglected, issue which resides in the grammar 
of religious belief.
Is there a problem?
After hinting at the problem of speaking about God, one must ask, 
however, if such a  problem really exists. Perhaps one is chasing a  rabbit 
that need not be caught If the problem of speaking of God is simply that 
one doesn't understand him, is this really a problem? Don’t people speak 
meaningfully about ideas and things they don’t understand all of the time? 
Surely they do, but at least with the people and things one speaks about 
without substantial knowledge, one shares much in common. While one
may not have substantial knowledge about the uniqueness of a  person or 
plant, one can discern a variety of attributes of the physical make-up of 
either. Also, one knows that a  human being has a  personaiity, likes and 
dislikes, and greater or fewer bad habits. One identifies these because he 
has these. They are familiar to him. Thus, the ground one shares with the 
variety of people and things in the physical world allow him to speak 
unproblematically about them. This is not to mean unproblematic in the 
sense that one never has mistaken judgments or speaks beyond what his 
knowledge warrants, just that his statements, whether true or faise, wise or 
foolish, do carry meaning. However, when theists use terms like 
“transcendenf or “wholiy-other" to characterize God, they establish, 
perhaps without intention, that God is not one about whom we are entitled 
to speak unproblematically.
In speaking of Carlos, a middle-aged man from Spain whom one has 
never met, one can say things like: “He Is a  thin man,” “He Is a  cat lover,” 
“He loves chocolate,” or “He Is a  good man.” Perhaps one Is mistaken on 
each of these judgments. Still she seems to be entitled to say them and she 
can Imagine what it would be like for any of those statements to be true of 
Carios. The same statements could even be made of one's mailbox: “He Is 
a thin man”, or “He Is a cat lover." Of course, these statements are
preposterous when predicated of one's mailbox. Nevertheless, one can 
make those kinds of predications and know they are preposterous because 
one has some true Ideas about mailboxes, and one knows that these 
statements do not and cannot meaningfully designate one.
But can one make meaningful statements about a wholiy-other 
God? Perhaps the atheist has no meaning problem when speaking about 
God, for God Is, perhaps, a hallucination of theists, and one can speak 
about hallucinations. Strangely, the problem of speaking meaningfully 
about God is principally a difficulty for theists, for believers. For them, the 
wholiy-other Is not a  hallucination, but a real, divine being. For theists, an 
account of the meaningfulness, the relationship of the predicate and the 
God, Is Imperative.
Meaningfulness in God-talk
In examining the mysteriousness of God-talk, many have argued that 
religious language Is hopelessly meaningless. Those who argued that this 
position Is true because either 1) much of religious discourse is unveriflable 
or 2) much of religious discourse cannot be falsified, were mistaken. Those 
positions were not able to stand up to philosophical Investigation. Chapters 
Two and Three will offer an examination of verificationism and the 
falslflablllty positions.
The issue of predication
Chapter Four will mention that the problem of meaning regarding 
utterances about God is not imagined. The real difficulty lies, as hinted at 
above, in predicating attributes of God. Theists make all sorts of assertions 
about God, a  being who they daim to be transcendent, a  word which by 
itself produces a  variety of problems. These assertions/predications about 
God sometimes involve odd words like “omnipotence,” “omnipresence,” or 
“omnisdence,” but more often involve ordinary words like “father,” “rock,” 
“shepherd,” and “light” It is difficult to see how such common words can 
characterize a  transcendent God. Thus, the problem that will be addressed 
is not one of the following two:
A) The problem of reference (i.e.. Does the word 
‘God’ refer to an existing being?), or
B) The problem of God’ (i.e., unique concerns about the word itself).
Rather, the problem of meaning in describing God is one of 
predication, one of applying the words one understands to a  God whom 
one does not understand. Can a substantive connection between God and 
‘rock’ hold? Can any connection between the two words hold? If theists are 
to speak meaningfully about God, there must be a connection. In other 
words, the literal meanings of ‘rock,’ ‘father,’ ‘shepherd,’ etc., are essentially 
fixed by certain causal, social, and physical features of the world. How,
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then, can these words be used unequivocally, with their literal meanings, to 
predicate anything of God, a being who has transcendent properties? There 
must be some way in which the predicate is moored to the thing it seeks to 
characterize. This is the mystery.
Analogical and metaphorical perspectives
Helpful dues to the mystery come from philosophers and theologians 
who examine language “at full stretch” in analogy and metaphor. Since St. 
Thomas initiated the analogical perspective, a  variety of philosophers have 
followed the way of analogical language. Most recently, metaphor has 
come to the forefront of the discussions. Chapter Five will examine the 
metaphorical perspective. These perspectives will be examined and found 
to be helpful in many respects, but faulty in others.
Narrative, predicative history and the predication question
Next, we wiil examine the centrality of narrative to the Western 
theistic tradition, giving particular attention to the way that narrative 
approaches the mystery of predication. Narrative fails as an answer to the 
problem of predication, as it simply pushes the problem away from 
language and onto the listener.
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The answer to the problem of predicating characteristics of God, it 
will be seen, can be solved by noting that theists and non-theists predicate 
within predicative histories. Each religious tradition contains a predicative 
history laid out by the sacred writings, scholars, and prophets of that 
tradition. These writings constitute the predicative history. The difficulties of 
predicating attributes of a  transcendent God do not impinge upon theists 
and non-theists who predicate within a predicative history.
Quite simpiy, this dissertation will argue for two ideas. First, the 
meyor danger in speaking of God is the possibility of predicating attributes of 
him, that is, of linguistically assigning properties or characteristics to him. A 
consequence of this danger is the need to formulate a view of theistic 
predication that resolves the difficulty. To resolve the difficulty, we shall see 
that predicates which describe God, describe God as illuminated by a 
particular predicative history. As we wiil see in Chapter Six, the response to 
the problem of predication briefly sketched above will be sufficient to 
answer the difficulty of speaking of a transcendent being.
12
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Chapter 2: Verificationism and reiigious discourse
Theists daim that some transcendent tieing exists, "God," who 
deserves our worship and otjedience. Most thoughtful theists believe that 
good reasons compel one to believe in the existence of such a being. Some 
have developed arguments that purport to prove, or inductively warrant belief 
in the existence of God. According to the twentieth-century challenge of 
verificationism, none of this matters. According to the verificationist challenge, 
one cannot speak meaningfully about God or the attributes of God.' Lacking 
the possibility for empirical verifiability, statements about God are untestable 
and consequently, according to the verificationist position, meaningless.^ 
Thus, arguments purporting to prove the existence of God are merely 
engaging in semantic trickery with a concept that is without content Asking 
"Does God exist?" makes no sense when the concept of God is meaningless. 
If the verificationist position is correct the language of religion is merely a 
complicated game of hide and seek in which the theist does not really even 
know what she is looking for.
As the position does not assert the non-existence of God, the 
verificationist position is not atheistic. However, by suggesting that the term 
"God" is meaningiess, the position is far more threatening to traditional
14
theism than atheism.^
Framing the contemporary discussion: the criteria reconsidered
The historical import of the verificationist and falsificationist* positions 
to the issue of religious language is obvious. Each charged that Important 
statements of religionists were meaningless. The former implies that they 
could not be verified, and the latter because religious utterances could not be 
falsified. That is, no ground could be provided under which the utterance 
would be shown to be false. Most every major treatment of the problem of 
religious language in this century has summarized these positions and 
sought to offer new insights into their rise and fall. These positions have 
served and will continue to serve as starting points for adequate treatments of 
the problem of religious language.^ For our purposes, the criteria of 
verification and falsification will serve as a  reference point and beginning 
explanation of the problem of religious language.^ While the both 
verificationism and the falsification critoria may no longer be philosophically 
live options, they can serve valuable roles in the thesis of this dissertation. 
Their importance is three-fold:
1) These positions are generally regarded as the m^'or assault on 
religious language in this century. They are of historic import for 
discussions of religious language.
2) Whether the positions are correct or mistaken, their fundamental 
thesis, that religious language is meaningless, is held by many to
15
be correct
3) A discussion of the positions is useful as a  historical landmark, a 
philosophical reference point from which new studies of the 
problem can orient themselves.
This chapter wiil show that the real problem of religious discourse is 
not found in a comprehensive inability to verify them empirically. The variety 
and quality of objections to the verifiability criterion relieve the theist from the 
duty of responding to its demand for tfie possibility of empirical testing. This 
chapter will outline some of tfiese objections and, In so doing, trace the 
demise of the verificationist position.
The verification criterion defined
The historical roots of the verification criterion lie in the Europe of the 
1920's and 1930's among a  group of analytic philosophers known as the 
Vienna Circle, who felt that something was substantially defective with 
religious utterances. The verification criterion is the msyor attempt of the 
"Logical Positivist" tradition to decipher the defect The positivist tradition 
sought a criterion of meaning upon which ianguage could be examined and 
tested. The hope was that the criterion could convict religious language of the 
crime of semantic gibberish. The position seemed plausible for several 
reasons. First there did seem to be something slippery with ttieistic language
16
as theists would attempt to define themselves out of problems or use 
ambiguous terminology which, it seemed, only those within the community of 
faith could understand. Second, verifiable statements could be examined and 
understood by both the theist and the non-theist Third, verifiable statements 
would be more likely to be dear and unambiguous. The criterion posits that 
meaningful statements must be either empirically or logically verifiable. 
Empirically verifiable sentences are statements which can, in prindple, be 
tested as to their veracity by means of observational (sdentific) testing. 
Statements like “It's raining outside,” or “My cat has fleas” are statements 
whose truth or falsity can be examined by looking to observable data. 
Logically verifiable sentences or sentence sets are true in virtue of the logical 
relations contained within. Statements like “All kittens are feline. George is a 
kitten, therefore, George is a  feline,” or other syllogisms are logically 
verifiable. Clearly, many important religious statements were neither 
empirically or logically verifiable. James Ross says. T he peculiarity of the 
religious situation is that the objects and events referred to in religious beliefs 
are not directly observable. God, in particular, is said to be wholly unlike or at 
least to transcend the objects of ordinary experience."^
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Some theistic replies
The positivists' daim scattered theologians into a  number of camps,
each trying to provide a new explanation for tiie meaningfulness of religious
language. Often, theologians began retreating prematurely without giving
adequate attention to defects In the positivist criterion. Recourses to fideism
or assertions that radical ambiguity is appropriate for theistic utterances were
unnecessary evacuations of traditional theistic replies to the strangeness of
religious discourse.
Theologians were in large numbers frightened by the apparent danger to 
religion from the positMsf s conclusion that metaphysical and religious 
statements are empirically meaningless because they cannot be empirically 
verified, and began a large-scale retreat into other accounts of religious 
meaning (emotive and other noncognitive accounts) before it was widely 
recognized by philosophers that there is no generally acceptable criterion of 
empirical meaning, much less of cognitive meaning in its widest sense.'
Ross colorfully mocked both sides of the debate by daiming that "positivist 
attacks overshot the mark and that the theologians' replies are, none of them, 
systematically convindng. In light of what we know now, the debate was as 
archaic as a fendng duel during an atomic war."^
One response that theologians could have offered would have been to 
daim that important theistic daims are analytic. A statement is analytic only if 
the truth or falsity of the statement is fixed solely by the meanings of the 
words or symbols in the sentence. Mathematical truths and tautologies
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commonly fall into this grouping. Statements like "All bachelors are 
unmarried" or T he cat is a feline" are also analytic. They are made true in 
virtue of the meanings of the words within the sentence. The statements are 
true by logical necessity. Such statements do not rely on evidentiary support 
external to the sentence to establish their veracity. Their truth is a function of 
the words in the sentence.
Theists can make statements about God that are analytic. A theist 
may observe that “God exists or does not exist" or that “God is either purpie 
or non-purple” or that “God is a deity.” These are analytic statements. 
Unfortunately for the theist, they have little relevance to the essential claims 
of theism. They are trivial and unimportant The statements that do matter to 
theists do not seem to be analytic. Statements like “God exists,” “God loves 
me,” “Christ is the Savior of the world,” and “Jesus rose from the dead on the 
third day” are not analytic. Perhaps the theist could argue that “God exists” is 
an analytic statement because the ontological argument is valid and sound. 
That is to say, given that the definition of God contains the necessity of his 
existence, the statement God exists is analytic. Furthermore, given the 
perfections that the ontological argument gives to God, the theist may argue 
that “God exists” necessitates a  God like the God of Christianity. Given that 
few philosophers, and theists for that matter, consider the classic ontoiogicai
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argument to be valid and sound, this reply is inadequate or at least practically 
of little value.
The truth or falsity of statements such as "Dan is a bachelor" or The 
cat is vicious" does not depend on the meaning of the words, but on whether 
they do, in fact, correspond with the real world. In order to establish the truth 
of Dan's marital status, we must ask empirical questions. "Does he have a 
marriage certificate?" "Is he known te have a wife?" "Does he fiie a joint 
return on his taxes?" These kinds of empirical questions will be instrumental 
in determining the truth about Dan's marital status. The verificationist 
declares that non-analytic sentences must be. in principle, subject te 
empirical examination. Those statements which are neither analytic nor 
empirically testable are not meaningful. Thus, the question of their truth or 
falsity is irrelevant The terms "true" or "false" cannot apply to statements 
without meaning.
The criterion’s  unveiled purpose
To say that A. J. Ayer viewed his criterion as antagonistic te religious 
discourse would be a serious understatement for, as Ayer asserts, "The point 
we wish to establish is that there cannot be any transcendent truths of 
religion. For the sentences which the theist uses to express such "truths" are
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not literally significant"^” He also explains that "the sentence, There exists a 
transcendent god' has, as we have seen, no literal significance."^  ^Rowe is 
correct in affirming that "As liberal as the idea of empirical verification may 
seem to be, the logical positivists argued that the statements of theology.. 
.fail to qualify as empiricaily verifiable and, therefore, are literally 
meaningless."^^ An unveiled objective of the Logical Positivist tradition was 
dearly to demonstrate the meaninglessness of religious discourse. The 
verification criterion was the main mechanism by which the positivist wouid 
make his case.
Revisions of the verification criterion
The criterion underwent a  number of modifications as responses to
objections raised, but the exdusion of much of reiigious language remained
constant under its various forms. The criterion shall be sketched from its
inception to its more complex descendants.
VI : "We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if,
and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to 
express-that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain 
conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being 
false."'”
V2: "...all truly significant assertions must be concerned either with the
facts of experience, in the sense in which they are the subject matter of the 
judgments of common sense and of empirical science, or else with the verbal 
means used to symbolize such facts."'^
V3: "A sentence has empirical meaning if and only if it is not analytic and
21
follows logically from some finite and logically consistent class of observation 
sentence[sic]." '^
According to Ayer, two distinctions should be made on VI. A 
proposition is “strongly verifiable” just in case its truth could be conclusively 
demonstrated by appeals to experience. By “verifiable in a  weak sense,” Ayer 
means to say that it is possible for experience to show the proposition to be 
probable.
The weak version
Weak verifiability is intended to save universal statements from the 
knife of conclusive verifiability.'  ^Statements like "Ail ravens are black" or "All 
Brazilians make grammatical mistakes" create problems for strong 
verification. While one may imagine likely counter-examples to either of these 
statements, many meaningful statements would be declared meaningless. 
The statement "No human can fly" would not be meaningful, as its truth could 
not be conclusively established. One might always find a counter-example 
(e.g., a living Superman). Without conclusive verification, the strong version 
of verifiability wouid judge the statement to be meaningless, in addition to 
violating the criterion of strong verifiability, it wouid also fail VI and V3. V2 is 
sufficiently vague to allow universal statements; unfortunately, it would seem 
to allow almost any statement to daim verifiability. The theist may argue that
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"God created the world" is dearly concerned with "facts of experience" 
consistent with "common sense. Clearly, V2 will not do the work of 
semantic exdusion which the verificationist intends.
Ayer considers two versions of weak verifiabilify. According to the first, 
we ask the following question about a  proposition: "Would any observations 
be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood?"^^ If there are 
relevant observations, then the statement is verifiable in a weak sense. Isaiah 
Berlin rejects this first version because 'relevance' is an impredse notion.^
He notes that it is not possible to give a more predse meaning to ‘relevance’ 
because "the word is used to convey an essentially vague idea".^  ^For what is 
"relevant to one person as an observation may be irrelevant to another. For 
a devout Jew, T he Lord is my shepherd” is, without question, relevant She 
has lived a life of service to the Lord and has, in her opinion, observed his 
guidance in her life and the lives of her family members. How can one judge 
her obsen/ations to be irrelevant? How can one test her observations about 
the Lord’s guidance in her life? Certainly, her experience is not relevant to a 
Buddhist living in another part of the world, at least not in any measurable 
way. Neither is her experience particularly relevant to a  tribesman in central 
Africa. Berlin correctly obsen/es, "As a criterion for distinguishing sense from 
nonsense, relevance plainly does not work: indeed to accept it is in effect to
23
abrogate the principle of verification altogether. "  ^ It is the purpose of a
criterion of meaningfulness to sort out statements that have meaning and
those that do not A criterion of relevance is sufficiently vague to preclude the
verification criterion from performing the function of adjudication on the issue
of meaningfulness.
The second version of weak verifiabi% offered by Ayer is as follows:
To make our position clearer we may formulate It in another way...we may 
say that it is the mark of a genuine factual proposition...that some 
experiential propositions can be deduced horn it in conjunction with certain 
other premises without being deducible from those other premises alone.
This criterion seems liberal enough.”
It is unclear whether this is a new version of the criterion, or an attempt
to clarify statements derived from other versions. Berlin notes that the above
version, if it is a  new form of the criterion, is far too weak in that verifiable in
this sense implies something like "made probable" or "plausible," both of
which are problematically obscure.^^ Also, one must ask what is intended by
the phrase "mark of a  genuine factual proposition." Further, the criterion
seems too liberal in that it would allow most any statement to be verifiable.
Berlin notes that one can imagine an argument wherein the mqor premise is
verifiable in this sense, yet the syllogism is not a  bearer of meaning. He offers
the following example:
This logical problem is bright green,
I dislike all shades of green,
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Therefore I dislike this problem.^
Perhaps a  better example is the following one. Let Ebe any 
experiential statement arxf let R be some religious daim. Then R is a  factual 
empirical daim because it is dedudble from [E & (~E v R)] but not from -E  v 
R.
The strong version
The strong version of verificationism failed, as noted earlier, in its 
attempt to account for universal statements. Statements of the kind 'All A's 
are B' can be problematic for the strong version where A's fall into an infinite 
dass. Richard Swinburne notes that the strong version is inadequate 
concerning statements like: all ravens are (at all times) black,' or 'all material 
bodies near the surface of the earth are (at all times) subject to an 
acceleration towards the earth of c. 32ft/sec.'.^ Carl Hempel discussed this 
problem, commenting that the "requirement rules out all sentences of 
universal form and thus all statements purporting to express general laws; for 
these cannot be condusively verified by any finite set of observational data."^
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The criterion doomed
The failure of strong verificationism forced a  reliance on weaker 
versions that eventually doomed the criterion. In order for verification to 
survive as a  viable criterion of meaning, it had to be broadened, since the 
stronger versions of the criterion could not allow universal statements. The 
success of the weak verifiability principle was essential to the success of 
verificationism in general, given that the strong version could not account for 
universal statements. The inability of the weak version to exclude many 
statements that the verificationists thought to be meaningless insured the 
demise of verifiability as a  criterion of meaningfulness.
General objections to verificationism
Three objections which have not yet been considered and apply te the
criterion in either its strong or weak versions should be recognized.
The first objection, put forth by Paul Marhenke, claims that the
verificationist position is circular in that it assumes that one already knows the
meaning of a  given sentence. Marhenke offers the following elucidation:
In the proper sense it [a sentence] Is said to be verifiable when it is possible 
to formulate the observation sentences that would verify the sentence if the 
sentence were true. But the possibility of formulating these observation 
sentences presupposes that the decision that the sentence is significant has 
already been made. You cannot devise an observation test until you know 
the meaning of the sentence you are going to test^
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This objection seems to miss the point of the verificationist position. 
The assumption of the verificationist is that one will not be able to develop 
observation tests for a  meaningless sentence. One may utter a  sentence that 
seems meaningful to him, yet when asked to give observation sentences 
which would conclusively verify the position, or make it probable, may find 
himself unable to provide those sentences. Of course, the fact that one 
cannot state the relevant observational test sentences for a  specific target 
sentence does not show that the latter lacks empirical content Another 
person may utter a  sentence that seems meaningful to him, and when asked 
to provide obsenration sentences which would verify the position, may find 
herself able to do just that Surely both of these people assumed that their 
sentences were meaningful, yet the first one learned othenwise when 
attempting to develop observation sentences to verify his sentence. Asking 
that person to give observation sentences to verify the original sentence does 
not presuppose that the original sentence is meaningful.
A second objection to the verifiabilify criterion (strong or weak) is that it 
fails to give an adequate account of fictional statements. Many fictional 
statements convey dear meaning, yet are not meaningful according to the 
criterion. Imagine a statement like "Bilbo Baggins is the Hobbit" Such a 
statement is not analytic, and it is not possible to empirically test the daim.
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No observation sentences could be used for the validation or invalidation of 
the daim. Is the daim meaningless? Surely not
The verificationist might reply that either (1 ) the criterion is not meant 
to test fictive discourse, or that (2) the daim is literally meaningless and 
religious language is likewise literally meaningless because it too, is fictive. 
The problem with the first response is that it ignores the objection-i.e., that 
there is meaningful discourse for which the criterion cannot account The 
verificationist may daim that this is a question begging response to the 
criterion. However, the verificationist it wouid seem, should provide some 
good reasons for the exdusion of all fictive discourse. The branding of much 
of human literature as “meaningless” is a prima fade  reason to reject the 
criterion. The second reply is wrong. "Bilbo Baggins is the Hobbit" is literally 
meaningful. The burden falls on the verificationist to give condusive reasons 
that the statement is meaningiess-reasons which are independent of the 
criterion under question, it is not suffident to simply stipulate that the criterion 
is an appropriate one.
If fictional discourse is meaningful and is not accounted for according 
to the criterion, then it is quite possible that other modes of discourse might 
fail outside of the criterion's scope as well. The criterion is shown to be 
inadequate if it is found that there exists meaningful discourse outside of its
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scope. Rctive discourse is just such an example of meaningful discourse that 
falls outside of the criterion. As we shall note in Chapter Six, fictive discourse 
plays a  vital role in the traditions of both philosophy and religion.
The third objection to the criterion is perhaps the most interesting of 
the three. This objection notes that the criterion cannot meet its own test for 
meaningfulness; thus, the criterion is not an acceptable adjudicator of 
meaning.
1. A sentence Is said to be meaningful just in case it is either 
analytic or empirically verifiable.
2. “A sentence is said to be meaningful just in case it is either analytic 
or empirically verifiable." Zis not analytic-i.e., its truth does not 
follow from the meaning of the words use in making the statement
3. Z is not empirically verifiable-there exist no observation sentences 
exist which could test the sentence.
4. Therefore, Zis not a  meaningful sentence.
5. Therefore, the verifiability criterion is not meaningful if it is true.
This is paradoxical.
The positivists replied that the verifiability criterion of meaning is not a 
statement but more like a rule or linguistic proposal.^ Because the criterion 
is not a  statement it is not meaningless. The criterion, according to this view, 
is not to be regarded as a statement which may be regarded as true or false, 
but as a  proposal about how meaningfulness can be demonstrated. As Rowe 
observes, this reply "convinced no one other than those already committed to
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the verification principle. "  ^The criterion seems to be presented by Ayer and 
others as an informative statement about meaning. If it looks like a  statement, 
smells like a statement and sounds like a  statement, then it probably is a 
statement rather than a prescriptive rule, if it is a  non-anaiytic statement, then 
it should, according to the verificationist be empirically verifiable. '^
Alvin Plantinga argued that the criterion, as interpreted by various 
verificationists, was either (1 ) far too restrictive or (2) far too liberal. He 
argued that "The many attempts to state the verifiability criterion have met a 
common fate; each has been so restrictive as to exclude statements the 
verificationists themselves took to be meaningful, or so liberal as to exclude 
no statements at all."^ Either verification was too restrictive, not just for 
religious assertions, but for many statements commonly taken to be 
meaningful, or tfie definition of verification was so broad as to exclude 
practically nothing from being meaningful.
Conclusions
When the dust finally settled between verificationism's antagonists and 
the criterion's various revisions, the main problem was that the criterion fell 
short of adequately delineating meaningful and meaningless sentences. The 
strong versions of verificationism were far too limiting. Strong versions which
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demanded the possibility of conclusive empirical verification succeeded in 
eliminating religious utterances, but also in eliminating most of metaphysics^, 
epistemology, and theoretical empirical science in the process.^ 
Furthermore, the strong versions had the unfortunate result of disqualifying 
universal empirical statements, including many scientific hypotheses.
The weaker versions of the criterion succeeded in excluding almost 
nothing.^ There are empirical observations relevant to most any statement 
with the exception of analytic ones. ‘Relevance’ is far too vague to strain out 
a significant number of meaningless statements. There are observation 
sentences relevant to the following statement "The geometry problem is 
furry, or my car is not brown." However, it is unlikely that many people would 
deem that sentence meaningful.' One can attach meaningless riders te 
empirically testable phrases by means of a  disjunct, thereby rendering the 
statement meaningful via the verification criterion. The opponents of the 
verifiability criterion won the day. Swinburne notes that strong verificationism 
is "generally agreed to be false. According to William Rowe, the verifiability 
criterion has "not survived as a viable philosophical thesis Alvin Plantinga
makes the following sweeping daim: "The fact is that no one has succeeded 
in stating a  version of the verifiability criterion that is even remotely plausible; 
and by now the project is beginning to look unhopeful."”
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The verifiability criterion Is not an adequate statement of the problem 
of religious language. The difficulty must lie elsewhere. However, in spite of 
the antagonists’ victory over the criterion, we shall see that the legacy of 
Logical Positivism stiii piays an important roie in discussions about reiigious 
language. Rowe notes that ‘There has remained a  feeling that the 
statements of theology and of much of traditional philosophy are somehow 
suspect, that if they yield no empirical consequences they are not really 
meaningful at all.”^  The role that verificationism still plays is to force theists to 
examine, as Dan Stiver says, "\vhether and how religious language makes a 
difference.”"
32
Notes
’ Among the advocates of verificationism are Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, 
KurtGoedel, Friedrich Waismann, A.J. Ayer and Rudolph Carnap.
 ^In Its basic form, the argument of the verificationist is as follows: 1 ) All non- 
analytic meaningful statements can be verified empirically. 2) Logical or 
mathematical statements are meaningful. 3) Many important factual religious 
statements cannot be verified empirically. 3a) No religious statement is analytic. 
Therefore, 4) Many important religious utterances are not meaningful.
In its simplest form, the verifiability criterion holds that a "statement is literally 
meaningful just in case it is either analytic or empirically verifiable." William Rowe, 
Philosophy of Religion, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993), p.92.
 ^On a historical aside, later discussion will demonstrate that the threat to 
theism was not accidental.
" The principle of falsification is that for a sentence to be meaningful, one 
must be able to produce the grounds under which the sentence would be said to be 
false. The position will be elucidated in detail in Chapter 3.
HTiomas McPherson noted that the positions help in pinpointing the worry 
about religious language and can also be instrumental in showing the way out of 
the problem. "Religion as the Inexpressible," in New Essays in Phibsophicai 
Theology, eds. Anthony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, (New York: Macmillan,
1973), p.142.
 ^John Hick noted that the verificationist and falsificationist positions have had 
a m ^ r influence on pushing philosophers of religion toward non-realist accounts of 
religious language. Hick notes that they pushed theists into arguing that religious 
language is, in some fundamental way, "unique* and unlike other kinds of 
utterances. Classical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, 
p.525.
 ^introduction to the Phibsophy of Religion, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1969), 
p.154. Certainly verificationists did take certain unobservable objects to be verifiable 
and statements about those objects to be meaningful. The positivists could accept 
the statement, "All Euclidean squares are four-sided figures” as meaningful. This 
would be the case even though "Euclidean square” would be true of ideal, abstract, 
Platonic entities that are unobservable (if it is true of anything). So, the fact that an 
object transcends sense experience is not sufficient for claiming that the sentence 
containing the term is meaningless by the verificationists’ position. What the 
verificationists mean to say Is that any statement which contains a "non-observable” 
object and that is not anah^ is meaningless.
® ibid., p.151.
33
 ^Ibid., p.152.
Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, (New York; Dover 
Publications, 1952), pp.117-18.
” ibid., p.119.
Rowe, introduction to Oie Philosophy of Religion, p.98. Thomas 
McPherson warns theists not to regard positivism as anti-religious. He claims that 
To regard it as anti-reiigious is wrong.. .The positivistic way is important both 
because it helps to pinpoint the worry and because it shows a way out of it" New 
Essays in Philosophical Theology, p. 142. McPherson may be correct in pointing out 
that positivism dears up the problem of religious language; however, its anti­
metaphysical bent puts it squarely opposite many tenets of theology.
Language, Truth and Logic, p.35. Rowe calls this work "the major 
manifesto of the movement" ibid., p.90.
This rendering was offered and dismissed by Isaiah Berlin, Aristotelian 
Society Proceedings, Vol. 39,1938-1939, (London: Harrison and Sons, 1939), 
p.225-26.
Cart Hempel, Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, ed. Leonard 
Linsky, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1952), p.45.
Language, Truth and Logic, p.37.
Isaiah Berlin notes that the weak sense "was invented to apply to 
general propositions and to singular-seeming propositions about material objects, 
in so far as these were thought to entail general propositions about sense data.” 
Aristotelian Society Proceedings, p.233.
One can imagine a range of semantic difficulties resulting from the phrase 
"common sense." The phrase is too impredse and indusive to do any real work for 
the verificationist.
Language, Truth and Logic, p.26.
^  "Relevance is not a precise logical category, and fantastic metaphysical 
systems may choose to daim that observation data are 'relevant to their truth.” 
Berlin, Aristotelian Society Proceedings, p.233.
2’ ibid.
^  ibid.
“  Language, Truth and Logic, p.26.
Aristotelian Society Proceedings, p.234.
^  ibid.
“  The Coherence of Theism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977),
p.23.
^  "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," in 
Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, ed. Leonard Linsky, (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1952), p.168.
“  Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, p.156.
^ "As a consequence, the empiridst criterion of meaning, like the result of
34
any other explication, represents a linguistic proposal which itself is neither true 
nor false, but for which adequacy is claimed in the following two respects: First in 
the sense that the explication provides a reasonably dose analysis of the 
commonly accepted meaning of the explkandum-and this daim implies an 
empirical assertion; and secondly in the sense that the explication achieves a 
"rational reconstruction” of the explicandum, i.e., that it provides, together 
perhaps with other explications, a general conceptual framework which permits a 
consistent and precise restatement and theoretical systematization of the 
contexts in which the explicandum is use and this daim implies at least an 
assertion of a logical character." Hempel, Semantics and the Philosophy of 
Language, p.61.
”  Philosophy of Religion, p.99.
A.C. Ewing makes the point with darity in his essay "Meaninglessness," in 
Readings In Religious Philosophy, eds. Geddes MacGregor and J. Wesley Robb, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), p.323. Originally published in Mind,
XLVI (1937), pp.347-364. He condudes, I ttiink correctly, that "the sentence 
[verifiabilify criterion] cannot be true, but must be either meaningless or false. 
According to my view it is the latter (p.323)."
“  God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief In God, 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990, originally published in 1967), p.163.
”  Copleston observed that the requirement that metaphysical statements 
be verifiable by empirical observation is to daim that "metaphysics-to be 
significant-should not be metaphysics." Frederick C. Copleston, "Logical 
Positivism: Discussion between Professor Ayer and Father Copleston," in 
Readings In Religious Philosophy, eds. Geddes Macgregor and J. Wesley Robb, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), p.329.
^  Berlin called this consequence "wholly untenable.” Aristotelian Sodety 
Proceedings, p.225. Hempel observed that "many of the formulations of traditional 
metaphysics and large parts of epistemology" would be considered "devoid of 
cognitive significance" if the criterion were accepted. Semantics and the Phibsophy 
of Language, p. 163.
“  God and Other Minds, p.163.
“  Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992),
p.23.
^  Rowe, Philosophy of Rellgbn, p.92.
“  God and Other Minds, p.167.
”  Rowe, Philosophy of Rellgbn, p.93-4.
^  The Phibsophy of Rellgbus Language, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1996), p.202.
35
Chapter 3: Falsification and reiigious discourse
The fact that some important theological statements are not subject to 
empirical examination does not disqualify them as meaningless. Though the 
verificationist objection to religious language was problematic, it was an 
important attempt to pinpoint the nature of tine difficulty of religious discourse. 
The most important descendant of the verificationist position is the 
falsificationist objection to religious language. Karl Popper, the chief 
proponent of this view, argued that in order for a statement to be meaningful, 
one must be able to describe circumstances under which the statement could 
be said to be false. If it is not logically possible to stipulate conditions under 
which a statement may be said to be false, then that statement is 
meaningless.
The principle of falsification
The theist daims that "there is a  God." According to Flew, most theists
seem unwilling to admit the existence of conditions under which this
statement would be false. Atheists make statements like: "Given the amount
of evil in the world, a  good God cannot exist," and "A benevolent deity would
not create a  world with the horrendous suffering that exists in this one." The
theist seems unwilling to yield his position to any objection that the atheist
conceives. The point is not the relative merit of atheistic objections to theism:
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it is that the theist seems unwilling to state to the atheist exactly what criterion 
would establish that a  God does not exist Thus, the atheist is left not 
knowing what he must prove in order to establish the non-existonce of God. 
The theist seems unwilling to entertain the possibility that God does not exist 
The atheist asks, "What must I show you to convince you that there is no 
God?" The theist answers, "You can give no evidence to convince me of 
that" The falsificationist position claims that if there are no conditions under 
which a daim can be falsified, then that daim is meaningless.
The best eluddation of the falsificationist position comes from John 
Wisdom's essay "Gods."  ^Wisdom asks the reader to imagine that two men 
are exploring in the jungle. While fighting their way through the jungle 
underbrush, they come upon a  dealing. In the dearing, the explorers find 
both flowers and weeds. One of the explorers suggests, 'There is a  gardener 
who tonds this plot" The other explorer, disagreeing with that speculation, 
daims that There is no gardener." So, both explorers pitch their tents and 
begin a round-the-dock surveillance. No gardener is ever observed. Thus, 
the explorers place a  barbed-wire fence around the small dearing. They 
electrify the fence and use bloodhounds to patrol the area at all times. Surely 
no gardener can go undetoctod here. However, no screams of pain are ever 
heard, and the dogs never bark. No movements In the garden or near the 
fence ever give notice of an intruder. Even so, this evidence does not 
convince the Believer. He daims that "A gardener does tend this plot He is
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invisible, non-physical, and never makes a sound or gives any indication of 
His presence. The gardener comes and secretiy tends this plot of land which 
he dearly loves." The Skeptic finds this conclusion to be unacceptable and 
irrational. He claims, "What exists of your original position? Just how does an 
invisible, non-physical, undetoctable gardener differ from no gardener at all?"
The point of Wisdom's story is that no empirical evidence exists that is, 
in principle, capable of defeating the assertion of the believer. No conceivable 
test, in regards to the garden, which the Skeptic can propose will satisfy the 
Believer that there is no gardener. Thus, for the Skeptic, the Believer is not 
being reasonable.
Falsification and statements about God
According to Flew, mqor theological assertions have the same 
problem as the one noticed by the Skeptic. A variety of important theological 
assertions. Assertions like 'God has a plan,' God created the world,' and 
God loves us as a  father loves his children' are problematic.^ Flew asks 
whether these are true assertions or not; for if they are assertions, then there 
must be some negation of the assertion.^ In other words, if something is an 
assertion, then it should be possible to state what the assertion denies, to 
identify a stato of affairs inconsistent with the assertion. Flew claims that "if 
there is nothing which a putative assertion denies then there is nothing which 
it asserts either: and so it is not really an assertion."^ The Believer seems
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unwilling to admit any evidence that would count against his daim about the
transparent gardener. In regard to Wisdom's parable, Flew notes:
When the Sceptic in the parable asked the Believer, "Just how does what 
you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an 
imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all?" he was suggesting that 
the Believer's earlier statement had been so eroded by qualification that it 
was no longer an assertion at all.^
The meaning issue for Flew is captured in the fact that meaningful assertions
posit both (1 ) some state of affairs and (2) the non-existence of another state
of affairs. Thus, to make a  statement like "it is raining outside” is to also make
a  statement against the state of affairs "it is not raining outside” or "it is sunny
outside.” Meaningful statements make daims about a state of affairs which
necessarily rules out other incompatible states. The problem of religious
language is, according to Flew, that many religious assertions do not posit
the non-existence of any state of affairs. When a  theist says "God loves me,”
he is unwilling to grant that any state of affairs could be incompatible with this
statement Receiving ten million dollars from a  winning lottery ticket is
evidence that supports the statement that "God loves me,” but my child dying
of leukemia is does not count against the statement that "God loves me.” The
theists statement rules out no state of affairs and, according to Flew, is not a
meaningful assertion. By being compatible with any conceivable set of
drcumstances, the statement makes no meaningful daim.
Now it often seems to people who are not religious as if there was no 
conceivable event or series of events the occurrence of which would be 
admitted by sophisticated religious people to be a sufficient reason for
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conceding There wasn't a God after air or "God does not really love us 
then”. Someone tells us that God loves us as a father loves his children. We 
are reassured. But then we see a child dying of Inoperable cancer of the 
throat His earthly father Is driven frantic In his efforts h) help, but his 
Heavenly Father reveals no obvious sign of concern. Some qualification Is 
made-God's love Is not merely human love' or It Is an Inscrutable love', 
perhaps-and we realize that such sufferings are quife compatible with the 
truth of the assertion that "God loves us as a father (but of course,...)”. We 
are reassured again. But then perhaps we ask: "What is this assurance of 
God's (appropriately qualified) love worth, what Is this apparent guarantee 
really a guarantee against? Just what would have to happen not merely 
(morally and wrongly) to tempt but also (logically and rightly) to entitle us to 
say God does not love us' or even God does not exist?”^
Thus, the theist who seems to make dramatic cosmological statements is 
really not making meaningful assertions at all. The inability to provide 
falsifying conditions for the claims leads one to question whether the claims 
are meaningful at all. If the theist is really making an assertion, then surely 
she can provide evidence that would count against the daim, or 
drcumstances which would be incompatible with the truth of the assertion.^
In order for a statement to be meaningful or cognitively significant, it 
must be possible to give evidence one would regard as "counting against" the 
statement or to eluddate a  state of affairs that would be "incompatible" with 
its truth.  ^ Michael Tooley offers this summary of Flaw's falsificationist 
position:^
1. Sophisticated religious believers do not seem to be willing to admit that 
there are any conceivable experiences or events whose occurrence would 
result in their abandoning some of their central theological affirmations.
2. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that there are no experiences or events 
whose occurrence would count against the truth of a typical theological 
statement.
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3. A statement is cognitively significant if and only if tfiere are experiential 
statements tfiat would decisively count against tfie trutfi of tfiat statement
4. Hence tfieologicai statements cannot be cognitively significant
In order to make a  cognitively significant assertion, one must say something 
about the facts of tfie world and, consequently, deny something about the 
facts of the world.
Traditional theistic responses
One response is to argue that the falsificationist position misses an 
important attitude which differentiates the believer and the observer. Basil 
Mitchell argues that the believer, as a  matter of fact, does not and cannot 
uncouple himself from his faith in God.'° It is this inability to detach himself 
that causes him to interpret the world differently from the observer.
Mitchell counters the parable of the garden with a  parable of his own. 
In an occupied land in a time of war, a  member of the resistance meets a  
mysterious stranger who claims to be a comrade in the resistance movement 
They spend the night in conversation, and the Stranger impresses the 
Partisan with his commitment to the resistance and his love for the cause. In 
fact the Stranger tells the Partisan that he is the leader of the resistance. The 
Partisan finds the Stranger to be believable and puts his trust in him. The 
Stranger leaves the following morning, and the two never meet again in
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privacy. At all future meetings, the Partisan is not free to discuss the 
resistance or speak intimately with the Stranger.
As time passes, the Partisan observes the Stranger in various 
circumstances. Ofton he sees the Stranger helping members of the 
resistance. Sometimes he asks for the Stranger's help and receives it At 
other times, he sees the Stranger turning over partisans to the police. 
Through all of this, he never doubts the Stranger but has faith in him. His 
friends murmur against the Stranger, but the Partisan sticks up for him. Each 
time that his comrades in arms question the Stranger's actions, the Partisan 
comes to his defense claiming, 'The Stranger knows what is best" 
Sometimes, his exasperated friends ask, "What would the Stranger have to 
do for you to doubt him-to admit that he is not on our side?" The Partisan 
never gives an answer to these questions because he refuses to put the 
Stranger to the test Sometimes his friends complain, "If this is what the 
Stranger does for our side, we would be better off with him on the enemy's 
side."
According to Mitchell, the attitude of the Partisan is parallel to the 
attitude of the theist While the theist does concede that certain 
circumstances count against his belief in the existence of God, he never 
doubts that a loving God exists. The situations where the Stranger works 
against the resistance constitute the Partisan's trial of faith. The Partisan can 
hold that either (a) the stranger is on the enemy's side or (b) he is on the side
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of the resistance but that he has reasons for withholding help/^
The Partisan refuses to do (a). The question that Mitchell asks is,
"How long can he uphold the second position without its becoming just 
silly?'"^
The attitude of the Partisan toward the Stranger flows from his first 
encounter with the Stranger and the trust that was built during that night 
Quite reasonably, the Partisan feels the full force of internal conflict when he 
sees the Stranger handing over members of the resistance to the police. 
However, he still holds that the Stranger is on his side.
The Partisan's assertions about the Stranger are meaningful in that (1 ) 
he does count some of the Stranger's actions as counting against his 
allegiance to the resistance and (2) the assertions stem from an explanatory 
framework developed in the first meeting.^^ "Does one want to say that the 
Partisan's belief about the Stranger is, in any sense, an explanation? It 
seems that one does. It explains and makes sense of the Stranger's 
behavior it helps to explain also the resistance movement in the context of 
which he appears. In each case it differs from the interpretation which the 
others put upon the same facts."'" Mitchell believes that the Partisan's beliefs 
about the Stranger provide a  meaningful framework through which the 
partisan understands the resistance and the actions of the Stranger. Does 
this mean that the partisan is correct in believing the Stranger is the leader of 
the resistance? No. But it does mean that the Partisan's assertions about the
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Stranger are meaningful.
Flew, rightly It seems, does not find the parable of the Stranger a
warrant against the falsification objection. The main problem with the parable
is that the theist claims that God is, among other things, omnipotent Unlike
the Stranger, God could, in prindpie, set right the battle without giving
members of the resistance over to the police. Rew argues.
But suppose the Stranger is God. We cannot say that he would like to help 
but cannot God is omnipotent We cannot say that he would help if he only 
knew: God is omniscient We cannot say that he is not responsible for the 
wickedness of others: God creates those others... I still think that in the end, 
if relentlessly pursued, he [Mitchell] will have to resort to the avoiding action 
of qualification. And there lies the danger of that death by a thousand 
qualifications..
What may have been a necessary evil for the Stranger, would not be in God's 
case. Obviously the theist can reply with the full range of responses to the 
problem of evil-the point, however, is that the parable does not accomplish 
the goal which Mitchell has for it Instead of a simple answer to tfie problem of 
falsification, the theist must begin a  defense of God's action or inaction with 
regards to the world, it does not seem adequate to appeal to God as the 
solution when the falsificationist daims that very notion (God) to be 
meaningless.
Like Mitchell, R.M. Hare offers a story to help answer the 
falsificationist objection. His parable is a  helpful addition to the discussion. 
Imagine that a certain lunatic is convinced that all Oxford dons wish to murder
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him. His friends introduce him to the mildest and gentlest of the dons, but he
believes them to be part of the plot After each of the friendly dons is
introduced, his friends tell him, "See, the don doesn't wish to kill you. He's
really a nice guy." But the lunatic reterts, "Yes, but he's just covering up the
piot It is a  diabolical cunning. He's just trying to get me off-guard." No matter
how many kindly dons are brought forward, the lunatic still maintains that
every don is out to murder him.
According to Flew's test, the lunatic is not making a  real assertion
when he daims that all dons want to kill him, for he will not accept any of the
evidence presented as counting against his fear of dons. Hare seems te have
found an interesting loophole in the falsificationist position, because, while
the lunatic's beliefs are not subject to falsification, we are still indined to say
that he has beliefs about dons that are contrary to the norm. If the lunatic is
not asserting anything, then we are not able to say that we believe differently
from him. Hare notes:
.. .it does not folbw that there is no difference between what he thinks about 
dons and what most of us think atx)ut them-othenwise we should not call him 
a lunatic and ourselves sane, and dons would have no reason to feel uneasy 
about his presence at Oxford.'^
Hare suggests that we call the difference between us and the lunatic a 
"blik." The lunatic has a  crazy bilk and we have a sane one. Hare suggests 
that we all have bliks and that Flew has shown that a blik does not exist in an 
assertion or system of assertions.
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It was Hume who taught us that our whole commerce with the world depends 
upon our bilk about the world; and that differences between bliks about the 
world cannot be settled by observation of what happens in the world. That 
was why, having performed the interesting experiment of doubting the 
ordinary man's blik about the world, and showing that no proof could be given 
to make us adopt one blik rather than another, he turned to backgammon to 
take his mind off the problem.'®
A blik, then, is a  sort of operating assumption about the world. Everyone has 
a  blik. Hare mentions that he has a  blik concerning his automobile. He knows 
that the steering of the car is accomplished by a  number of steel joints and 
rods. But what will happen if the steel rods break? He asks, "How do I know 
that this wont happen?"^^ The truth is that he simply accepts it He has a  blik 
about steel and its properties and, therefore, does not continually doubt the 
safety of his car's steering system. Certainly his blik about the steering 
column could change. He may at some point believe the steering column to 
be unsafe. At that point he says, "I shall never go in a  motor-car."^ Clearly, 
his blik would be different from the normal one.
Would his newly acquired blik about the faultiness of steering columns 
be falsifiable by testing? He notes that "No amount of safe arrivals or bench- 
tests will remove my blik and restore the normal one; for my blik is compatible 
with any finite number of such tests.
The problem with the falsificationist position, according to Hare, is that 
the position seems to regard religious discourse as some sort of explanation 
according to a  scientific notion of explanation. This is a  confusion about the
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function that religious utterances serve.
. . .  it is nevertheless true to say that, as Hume saw, without a blik there can 
be no explanation; for it is by our bliks that we decide what is and what is not 
an explanation. Suppose we believed that everything that happened, 
happened by pure chance. This would not of course be an assertion; for it is 
compatible with anything happening or not happening, and so, incidentally, it 
is contradictory. But if we had this beiief, we should not be able to explain or 
predict or plan anything. Thus, although we should not be asserting anything 
different from those of a more normal belief, there would be a great 
difference between us; and this is the sort of difference that there is between 
those who really believe in God and those who really disbelieve in him.^
Hare concludes his assault on the falsificationist objection by noting
that in the parable of the garden, the two followers have important
differences. The difference shows itself in the strength of attachment of the
believer to his beliefs. He is not abie to achieve the detachment from his
beliefs that the falsificationist criterion demands.
The explorers do not mind about their garden; they discuss it with interest, 
but not with concem. But my lunatic, poor fellow, minds about dons; and I 
mind about the steering of my car; it often has people in it that I care for. It is 
because I mind very much about what goes on in tiie garden in which I find 
myself, that I am unable to share the explorers' detachment^
His point seems to be that it is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
detach oneself from one's blik. In this regard, the falsification criterion is 
unreasonable.
Flew calls Hare's response "fresh and boid"^"-then he launches a 
perceptive attack on the blik response. He notes that most theists do not 
believe their religious assertions to be about bliks, but positive statements 
about the cosmos. He claims that "If Hare's religion really is a  blik involving
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no cosmological assertions about the nature and activities of a  supposed 
personal creator, then surely he is not a  Christian at all?"^ Cieariy, most 
theists believe that they are making statements about the universe and not 
about their biiks. However, this could be said of most anyone with a blik.
The general hypothesis objection
One of the m^or problems with the falsification criterion is its exclusion
of general scientific hypotheses. John Losee notes that "No amount of
negative evidence is sufficient to falsify the daim that there exist quarks
(neutrinos, viruses, capiilaries, binary systems of white dwarf stars, etc.)'".^
As a resuit, 'There are good reasons, then, not to accept faisifiabiiity as a
criterion of empirical meaningfulness. Do sdentists conform to a  standard
of methodological falsificationism? Losee daims that in important instances in
the history of sdence, they have not He notes,
A hasty survey of episodes from the history of science reveals that scientists 
as a matter of fact often do not abandon a theory upon its failure to pass a 
test. The following responses proved fruitful:
1 ) Mendeleef, confronted with evidence that the atomic weight of Tellurium is 
greater than that of Iodine, nevertheless interchanged the positions of these 
two elements in order to presence the regularities demanded by his periodical 
arrangement.
2) Leverrier and Adams, confronted with evidence that the orbit of Uranus 
does not conform to the requirements of Newtonian Gravitational Theory, 
posited the existence of a trans-Uranic planet
3) Pauli and Fermi, confronted with evidence that the reaction-products in B- 
decay possess less energy than the original nucleus, hypothesized that a 
new partide-the neutrino-carried off just enough energy to insure energy
48
conservation.”
The point Losee Intends to press is that the scientific community does not 
accept the falsificationist position as categoricaily binding on its research and 
that, often, such a criterion would have hindered scientific progress. 
Accordingly, the attempts of falsificationists to use the criterion to separate 
scientific and religious hypotheses have proved ineffective.^ According to 
Losee, Theological interpretations cannot be excluded from the range of 
empirically significant discourse upon appeal to faisifiabiiity."^
Conclusions
The falsificationist criterion has not succeeded in demonstrating the 
meaninglessness of religious language. The main worry with religious 
discourse is not that religious claims are not falsifiable-many of them are. If 
there are religious claims that are not falsifiable, tiiey are no different from a 
multitude of general scientific hypotheses. While the theistic assumption that 
a transcendent God exists may be false, the assertion may or may not be 
meaningless. It is a  potentially meaningful blik for encountering the world and 
it is unreasonable to demand that the theist be able to present circumstances 
under which her claims would be falsified. The real worry with religious 
language must lie elsewhere.
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Chapter 4: The problem of predication
Language is stretched to extraordinary lengths when one seeks to 
speak about some event or object that is outside the realm of mundane 
experience. Peter Cole and John Lee dalm that this is the chief difficulty 
faced by religious language. According to Cole and Lee, T he heart of the 
problem seems to be that religious assertions attempt to refer to things 
beyond anyone’s experience. They describe the ‘infinite’, the ‘mysterious’ and 
other metaphysical ideas that are not dealt with by our everyday language, 
and it is thus difficult to see whether these religious terms have meaning.”^ 
They are surely correct insofar as it is difficult to talk about anything that lies 
outside of human experience. Their summary of the difficulty is inadequate, 
though, in that it does not recognize the difficulty in applying mundane 
predicates to this object that lies outside of human experience. This subject- 
predicate question is one which plays a  dominant role in the discussion of 
speaking about God.^
This chapter will argue that the problem of predication is a central 
problem for theists in speaking about God. We will first examine the nature of 
the difficulty in predicating of God, tine modes of predicating of God and, the 
Thomistic attempt to answer the difficulty of predicating of God.
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General problems off predication
One may argue that the probiems in taiidng about God are no different 
from the problems that inhere in any account of meaning derivation. This is to 
say that predicating attributes of God is difficult because predicating attributes 
of anything is problematic. That is, any attempt to predicate is problematic. 
James Ross contended that The problems of the philosophy of religion are, 
in general, not problems peculiar to the subject matter of religion. The reason 
we don't have a  satisfactory account of the cognitivity of religious discourse is 
primarily that we don’t have an adequate account of meaning derivation in 
general”.^  Perhaps the derivation of meaning is an area wtiere general work 
needs to be done; however, many difficulties seem to be unique to language 
which speaks of God.
While language which predicates of God may not be uniquely challenged 
by the falsificationist and verificationist objections, it is peculiar language in 
that the relationship between predicate and subject may be labeled unclear 
without a  philosophical system through which one can understand the 
relationship. Such a  philosophical system seems unnecessary when talking 
about dogs, trees, or Aunt Wilma’s cheesecake. People who speak about 
such things have an intuitive notion of the subject-predicate relationship, one
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that hardly demands a philosophical investigation. The subject-predicate 
relationship when theists speak about God is, for many, not intuitive. William 
Rowe notes, "Clearly a m^'or task for theologians and philosophers of religion 
is to develop a  satisfactory theory explaining how predicates taken from the 
human, finite realm can be meaningfully applied to an infinite, timeless, purely 
spiritual being.""* This is the task which chapter six will clarify.
Predicating of God
To what does this problem of predication amount? is there a  problem in
considering God apart from ambiguous predicates like “omnipotence,”
“omniscience” and the other “omnis”. Should theists not be able to approach
the divine entify without recourse to such obscure terminology? Many of the
predicates used to characterize the qualities of God in a direct sense are
noticeably vague. And as D.Z. Phillips notes, oftentimes “We are told to
swallow the incomprehensible because so-and-so says it is true. No wonder
many balk at giving the language of religion any serious attention.”^
Predicates like “brown,” “tali” or “chalky” unprobiematically describe things
like dogs, trees and Aunt Wilma’s cheesecake. However, the predicates that
are not vague, but in normal usage quite dear, present even more probiems
when talking about God. How is it that predicates like "father," "light," or
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"rock" describe God? As if it were not enough that intractable words like 
"transcendent" are applied to God, the application of mundane human 
predicates to God demands an answer to the question of just how those 
words apply to God. There are several ways that they can be said to 
predicate characteristics of God; (1 ) they may univocally predicate attributes 
of God; (2) they may equivocally predicate of God; or (3) they may in some 
sense analogically predicate attributes of God.
Univocal, Equivocal and Analogical modes of discourse
Unlvocallty. Univocal description means that the predicate characterizes 
the subject in a  direct one-to-one way. Historically many philosophers and 
theologians have defended the position that some religious predicates 
describe God univocally. John Duns Scotus, evangelical theologian Carl 
Henry, liberal theologian Schubert Ogden, and analytic philosopher William 
Alston have all defended this view.  ^In this view, the predicate describes the 
subject without qualification. To say that "Wilbur is the father of Suzanne" is 
to make the daim that tiie predicate, "father,” directly describes the 
relationship of Wilbur to Suzanne. No difficult nuances influence the 
application of "father" to Wilbur; no special use of tfie word "fattier” controls its 
application to Wilbur; only a  blunt and straightforward statement affirms that
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Wilbur Is the father of Gordon. "Wilbur" and "father of Gordon" designate the 
same thing.
To hold that the human predicates which describe God describe in this 
one-to-one sense would be naive. If the word "rock” bears a one-to-one 
relation to God, then the theist is in deep trouble. Cieariy, God is not a  rock in 
a univocal sense, it would seem that the only predicates which may apply to 
God in a univocal way are ones which have no limiting function. At least, no 
limiting function other than the fact that they speak of one or several 
attributes of God and not all of them at the same time. One may predicate 
terms like “transcendence,” “limitless power,” “eternal existence,” or “infinite 
goodness” in a  univocal sense. Generally, these univocal predicates cany 
problems of their own. It could be argued that “transcendence” expresses an 
unintelligible concept or that “infinite goodness” is a  meaningless term. At this 
point, it is not necessary to consider the merit of these objections. It is 
enough to note that if any predicates can be made to apply to God in a 
univocal way, these-for better or worse-are the likely candidates. William 
Alston pointed out that “The impossibility of literal talk about God has become 
almost an article of faith for theology in this century.”^  Alston himself does not 
hold this view.
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It is both interesting and useful to note that ‘literal’ statements about God, 
or anything for that matter, need not necessarily be unambiguous. Literal 
statements can suffer from problems of vagueness just as non-literal 
statements can. Alston notes that “Meanings that words have in a  language 
can be more or less vague, open-textured, unspecific, and indeterminate in a 
variety of ways. Hence I can be using words literally and still be speaking 
vaguely, ambiguously, or unspedfically."^ I might say to you “Smith is big.” 
This is a literal, straightforward statement about Smith. Yet, if standing in a 
full room of Smiths, it may be unclear which Smith I am intending to describe. 
Further, it may be unclear what I mean by the word “big.” Is Smith 
overweight? Is Smith tall? Does Smith have an overbearing personality? 
Thus, to speak literally of God or anything is not necessarily to speak 
unprobiematically.
Equivocation. The second alternative is that of equivocation. According 
to Dan Stiver,
The assertion that ail religious language is equivocal, and must be negated, 
may strike us as being skeptical and belonging rather to unbelief than to belief. 
What is perhaps surprising at first glance is that this view is often held by those 
who are most emphatic about the reality and vividness of an experience of 
God. This is a characteristic view of the mystical tradition that, according to 
some, cuts across different world religions.”
Without question, predicates can describe their subject in a  completely 
equivocal way. This is to say that the relationship of predicate and subject is
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completely without connection or without observable connection to each 
other. An example of equivocation might be the difference between tfie 
claims that (A) "my left slice is the President of Botswana" and (B) "my left 
shoe is God.” It is not the empirical falseness of eitfier daim that is of interest 
for our discussion, but the fact that the predicate and the subject seem, in (B) 
to bear either (1 ) no relation or (2) a  completely unobservable relation. In (A), 
it is simply false that my shoe is tfie President of Botswana. But if one were to 
genuinely assert (B), falsity is not the Issue. Meaninglessness arises as the 
issue. If either (1 ) or (2) is the case, then the statement seems to be 
meaningless. It would appear that (1 ) is the case.
The position that predicates describing God are purely equivocal would be 
one that many non-theists would hold as most tenable. For one who believes 
that there is no referent to the word "God,” properties applied to "God” will be 
pure equivocation. Theists may use terms like "strong” or "loving” to apply to 
"God,” but what the theist perceives as God is, perhaps, some set of 
psychological experiences or some phenomena unrelated te an actual 
omnipotent being. It is possible to view the predicates as purely equivocal, 
but that they describe something like, a) a  figment of the theisfs imagination, 
b) a fictive being or c) some set of phenomena which the theist interprets as 
God and therefore applies predicates to this collection of experiences. In
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these cases, while belief In God might be a false belief, one may still
predicate of God. This might be the case with the statement about my left
shoe-that It Is a  hallucination.
To many modem theists this position may seem absurd and wholly
unacceptable; however, it Is a position that has Influenced and will continue
to Influence discussions of religious discourse.
This approach Is a reminder, especially to the unlvocal way, that language is 
notoriously unstable when applied to God. We are stretching It to its breaking 
point—and perhaps beyond. It is a warning against the Idolatry of language. 
Even religions centered on writing and speaking can see how language 
functions to protect the transcendence of God. An obvious example in the 
Jewish tradition was the earlier refusal to speak or write the name of God, 
with the result that today we still are not sure of what that name was.^°
Stiver produces a  balanced critique of the equivocal and unlvocal ways of
predicating and finds both to be objectionable.
It is apparent that the unlvocal way is still alive and well, but that it has its 
endemic problems. It may be that if the only choice is between equivocal or 
univocal language, many may choose the latter; but the cost is high. It is 
difficult to see how we can move from literal language, with Its context in 
everyday life, to the transcendence of God without sacrificing something 
precious to common religious sensibilities."
Pure equivocation and pure univodty seem to be polar opposites. Neither of
them seems a meaningful mode through which predication of God is
possible. The search will now turn to middle-ground, the way of analogy.
Analogy. The need for a third approach to predication led S t Thomas
Aquinas to analogy. By defending analogy as a  tenable way to describe God,
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he began what has remained the most significant approach to the application 
of predicates to God. Janet Soskice daims that his approach was intended 
as "a middle way between terms used in only one straightforward sense, 
univocally, and terms used in more than one sense which bear no relation to 
one another, equivocally.”^  ^Stiver notes that "his appeal to analogy became 
the standard model for understanding religious language”^  ^His approach 
has been a nursemaid to a  number of approaches, its most significant 
offspring being metaphorical approaches to problems in religious discourse. 
Versions of the analogical position will occupy the remainder of this 
monograph, with paiHcuiar emphasis given to a  narrative way of 
understanding analogy.
Proponents of the analogical position do not, for the most part, say that all 
predicates characterizing God are analogical, but that certain problematic 
predicates serve as analogues to the divine. The statement, "God is a  rock” is 
dearly not one that can be sensibly taken as  a  unlvocal statement about 
God. God is not, strictly speaking, a  rock. He does not possess the range of 
attributes necessary to fit into the category of rocks. He is (1 ) not a  mineral 
and (2) presumably does not possess the property of solidity. Argument is 
really not needed here and the obvious is being belabored. "Rock” does not 
univocally describe God. Does It then describe God in a  purely equivocal
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sense? The common theistic reply is to say "no" and to daim that “rock" 
characterizes God in an analogical way. While God does not literally possess 
the property of solidity, many daim that he does possess the quality in an 
analogical way, i.e., he is like a  rock in that his character does not change.
He is like a rock in that he is one who can be depended on. While he does 
not instantiate every property of rockhood, though he does share in some of 
them. Just as one might say of a  person that she is like a rock, one might use 
the word "rock” to describe God.
Thomas began with the assumption that every term used to describe God 
must, in an important sense, not be true of him. For we are more sure of what 
God is not than of what he is. Thomas does not, however, stop here. For, as 
Stiver notes, "He shares the later Scotist conviction that we do have cognitive 
revelation, that is, we know something of God and can express this 
knowledge in language.”''* The proper position is lodged between the 
extremes of univodty and equivocation and is the middie-ground of analogy. 
Thomas' theory of analogy has been interpreted in two major ways, 
attribution and proportionality.
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Analogy of attribution
Analogy of attribution can be understood in Thomas’s example of the use 
of the word "health." We often speak of people as being healthy. To say this 
is to say quite literally that they possess the property of health. However, we 
also can speak of medicine as being healthy. Obviously, medicine does not 
possess health in the same way that peopie possess it What other way is 
there? Medicine is healthy in that it causes peopie to be heaithy; thus, it is 
healthy in a secondary sense. Thus, while God may not possess "love” or 
justice" in the normal human understanding of the two terms, clearly these 
attributes may be predicated of him because he is the cause of those 
characteristics in human beings.
One may object that analogy of attribution allows everything to be 
attributed to God without qualification. Since there is a great amount of evii in 
the world, why not attribute that to God as well? To this Stiver notes that 
Thomas may respond in two ways. First, he can appeal to his understanding 
of evii as the absence of being. To attribute evil to God is to literally attribute 
nothing to God since evil is not a  thing. Secondly, Thomas can respond that 
since God is infinite, predicates that are without iimit wouid best describe him. 
“Thus, “good” is more appropriately applied to God than is “lion.”’® Within this
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metaphysical system his replies are adequate. As we shall find, there are 
serious reasons to question his system.
The problem of Thomistic attribution revolves around the role he gives to 
causation.'” According to Thomas, we have goodness, wisdom, love, etc., 
because it is caused by a God who possesses these qualities In infinitude. 
The proper question to ask is in what sense does he use "causality.” It would 
seem that if we predicate causalify of God in a straightforward univocal sense 
then his theory of analogy is based on the one univocal assumption that God 
is cause.'^ Would not the straightfonward predication of causality to God bring 
the whole family of univocal problems discussed earlier to bear on his 
analogical position? A univocal application of causality to God in order to 
explain the use of analogy is not satisfactory given his own rejection of 
univocal application of predicates to God.
However, if "causality” is predicated as an attribute of God analogically, 
then Thomas is caught in circular reasoning. If the application of analogical 
predicates to God makes sense given that God is the cause of those same 
properties we see in the world, and "causation” is predicated of God 
analogically, then the explanation of analogical predication given by Thomas 
is unsatisfactory. Richard Swinbume holds that the Thomistic explanation of 
analogy is, because of this, contradictory.'” Perhaps the position is not
63
inconsistent with Itself, but circular. It is not dear which would be the worse 
defect Either way, the attribution version of applying predicates analogically 
is internally doomed.
A final objection to the attribution version of Thomistic analogy theory is, 
as hinted at earlier, that it rests on highly questionable metaphysical ground. 
He assumes that God stands atop a  causal chain leading down to the world 
and that, because of this causal relationship, we can predicate analogically 
up the chain. This assumption seems less than obvious given the 
development of metaphysics in the last few hundred years and the 
contemporary rejection of the cosmological proote for the existence of God.^^
Analogy of proportionality
The second approach to analogical predication is termed proportionality. 
To say, for example, that a  human being is free, and a  falcon is free, is 
merely to say that each has freedom in a  mode appropriate to it A human 
being has freedom in the way appropriate to human beings, the falcon in a 
way appropriate to falcons. The term "freedom" functions in very different 
ways when referring to men and falcons, yet these functions are similar in 
some respects. A proportional connection exists between the freedom of men 
and falcons. When describing God, the proportionality is simply extended. It
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could be properly said then that freedom is to a  falcon as freedom is to God. 
Unfortunately, the proportional use of analogy has, as did attribution, certain 
difficulties.
Normally, at least two of the three terms in the analogical relation will be 
known. We have an idea of what the properties of men and falcons are and 
can rationally or at least meaningfully predicate freedom of both. In the case 
of God, however, we are left with two unclear parts of the analogical triad. In 
the example that freedom is to God as freedom is to man we come in (1 ) not 
having a way to know who God is and (2) therefore not knowing what the 
term “freedom" means in reference to God. Only “freedom” predicated of man 
is meaningful. Neither tfie term “God” nor the term “freedom” carries any 
distinct meaning going into the comparison between freedom in men and 
freedom relating to God.^ "God" is not distinct, or the analogy would not be 
necessary in the first place. "Freedom" is a word which carries distinct 
meaning only when operationally defined by the subject matter. A man is free 
in a way quite distinct than that in which a  falcon is free. It is not a simple 
matter of quantify or proportion. The man is not more free and the falcon less 
free. The difference is in the qualify or mode of freedom. While Wilbur, my 
father, and I may have freedom in the same mode, can it be rationally said 
that God and I have freedom in the same mode? Perhaps, but this position
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would require a  strong argument and perhaps, most problematically, an 
understanding of what It Is like to be God. Humans, presumably, know what It 
Is like to be free as a  human but cannot rationally pretend to know what It Is 
like to be free as a bird. As a human being It Is not likely that one will ever 
know what It Is like to be a falcon, much less, what It Is like to be God.
Both analogy of attribution and of proportionality are grounded on dubious 
metaphysical soll.^  ^Thus, neither mode of predicating properties of God Is 
adequate. As James Ross notes. The theory of analogy (which Is the 
classical answer of the Aristotelian and medieval philosophers to this general 
problem) was never fully worked out”^  While medieval expositions of 
analogy may be unsatisfactory In our age, they do provide a  helpful starting 
point for modem philosophical Investigations of religious language. Modem 
solutions to the problem of predication most always take a  tum toward 
analogical language at some point
Conclusions
The Insights of Thomas provided direction for the discussion of predicating 
characteristics of God, but were unsatisfactory as explanations of the 
analogical nature of much religious discourse. His Insights do, however, 
further Illustrate the notion that the problem of predication lies at the heart of
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many difficulties in discovering meaning in religious discourse. Rational 
agents find a  great number of predicates to be meaningful, yet they have 
great difficulty imagining what it would mean for some of these predicates to 
be applied to other creatures. It may be known what it would be like for both a 
human and a  tree to be large or to predicate "blue" to both a  human's and a 
bird's eyes. Many would find it meaningful to predicate "friendly" to a dog's 
behavior as well as a  girl's behavior. However, while we may know what it is 
for a man to be "just," "good," or "truthful," can we know what it Is for a dog to 
have these qualities predicated to him? The answer would seem to be "no.” 
Likewise, the problem of predication is that it seems we cannot know what it 
means for God to have these either.
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Chapter 5: Metaphor and the problem of predication
One of the popular ways to address questions of meaningfulness in 
religious language has been to develop a metaphorical approach to 
understanding difficult religious expressions or, in more general terms, to 
develop a holistically metaphorical approach to theology. Gordon Kaufman 
notes that “God is ultimately profound mystery and utterly escapes our every 
effort to grasp or comprehend him. Our concepts are at best metaphors and 
symbols of his being, not literally applicable.”' As Stiver observed “Since the 
1960s, metaphor has leapt from its relegation to the sidelines of discussion 
about cognitive language to the forefront”^  He continued by noting that “a 
sea-change has occurred with regard to the understanding of metaphor, 
making it philosophically significant and having repercussions in many areas. 
Some of the most important effects have been in religion”.^
The positivist tradition minimized metaphor because of its inherently 
ambiguous nature. However, the passing of positivism made possible the 
rebirth of metaphor in phiiosophicai circles.
A major handicap historically to perceiving the significance of metaphor for 
philosophy and religion was the increasing marginalization of metaphor to the 
position of a figure of speech or ornament to language, important to rhetoric 
and poetics but not for philosophy. It is this situation that has radically and 
quickly dianged, altering the philosophical landscape in the last half of the 
twentieth century.^
Stiver is correct While philosophy of religion has become increasingly
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concerned with questions of religious language, these questions have most 
commonly looked to metaphor for answers. Proponents of metaphorical 
approaches to religious language no longer stand at the periphery of 
philosophical discussions, only to have their positions labeled "quasi- 
philosophy," but they now find themselves at the center of a raging debate 
about whether religious discourse makes sense, or whether it even can make 
sense. The positivists have lost their position at center stage, only te be 
replaced in the spotlight by their rivais the metaphorists. Demands for 
precision in religious discourse have not been dropped but have become less 
prominent, and metaphorical views of religious language have gained 
prominence and, in many circles, acceptance.
This chapter examines the metaphorical response to the problem of 
speaking about God, principally the position of popular metaphorist Sallie 
McFague. As it is important te get an understanding of what a metaphorical 
perspective on religious language entails, and her position is a major 
representative of the metaphorical perspective, it is necessary to do quite a 
bit of expository work on her position. By clarifying McFague’s work, we will 
better understand the rationale of the metaphorical approach to religious 
language. Finally, it is argued that while the metaphorical perspective is a  
promising direction for the answer, McFague’s view is not adequate.
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A metaphorical perspective
By speaking metaphorically about God, metaphorists mean that God 
Is referred to by comparison. The metaphor (e.g., "rock,” "fortress,” 
"shepherd”) Is used as a sort of model for God. William Alston says,
what the metaphorical statement most basically "says” is that the exemplar 
can usefully be taken as a "moder of the subject The hearer is invited to 
consider the templar as a model of the subject, as a way of discovering, 
highlighting, or rendering salient, various features of the subject'
Through the use of a  linguistic model (metaphor) the hearer Is able to 
understand, at least In part, something about a transcendent God In terms of 
something which Is available and known.
In some respects the metaphorical approach Is a  response to the 
positions outlined In Chapters 1 and 2. Perhaps It Is not simply the case that 
the veriflcationlst and falslflcationlst positions are Internally problematic, but 
perhaps they are limited In that they can only account for "straightforward" 
proposltional language. If religious language is, at a fundamental level, 
ambiguous, then perhaps It falls outside the scope of either verlflcationism or 
falslficati’onlsm. The sterile language of the positivist has been replaced with 
the rich language of the metaphorist The merit of this change Is subject to 
debate, but for our purposes It Is enough to give a  head nod to the change 
and begin evaluating this new perspective—the metaphorical perspective. 
Even traditionally non-llngulstic concerns for philosophers of religion are
72
being drawn into language issues. If the problem of evil is to be answered, 
philosophers and theists must wrestle with the meaning problematic terms 
like “omnipotence” and “omniscience” and metaphors like “Father” and 
“Shepherd.” Would a  “Father” or a  “Shepherd" allow his children or flock to 
face the amount and variety of evil that humankind faces every day? 
Linguistic considerations, especially metaphor, are increasingly coming to the 
forefront of such discussions.
McFague’s  metaphorical view
One of the mayor proponents for a metaphorical approach to religious 
language is Sallie McFague.^ Instead of focusing on the issue of predication, 
which as it has been argued is the leading problem with such language, 
McFague holds that the main difficulties with religious discourse “from both 
the worship and the interpretive contexts of religious language, are idolatry 
and irrelevance."^ An idolatrous view of religious language takes language 
about God to be rigid, inflexible and dogmatic. In such a view, the language 
itself becomes the main object of attention, not the supposed divine being 
beyond the language. The irrelevance extreme is the view that the language 
of religion is wholly non-applicable to modem life. Religious language is 
pushed to the periphery of life and regarded as pure sentimentality or 
gibberish.
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To those who daim that religious language is simply straightforward, 
that it speaks in dear and univocal ways about God, she argues that they 
have idolized the language. This is to say that they have spoken too literally 
about the transcendent being. This view, she argues, pours concrete on 
language, which should remain liquid and living-flexible. It interprets highly 
symbolic language in one-dimensional literalistic ways.
To appropriate the metaphor of a Zen sutra, poe^ is like a finger pointing to 
the moon.' It is a way to see the light that shines in darkness, a way to 
partidpate in transcendent truth and to embrace reality. To equate the finger 
with the moon or to acknowledge the finger and not perceive the moon is to 
miss the point.^
Similarly, "We are never able to point to this or that object or quality of 
experience and say. That is what the name "God” denotes.’ Any such direct 
identification of God with a  particular in the world would be idolatrous.”^  
Arguably, much of traditional theism is guilty of just this. Metaphors which 
come to be regarded as literal are, according to McFague, dead metaphors.^" 
McFague's objection to literalistic interpretations of religious statements does 
not reduce to the Thomistic objection to univocality.
McFague’s  motivation
McFague’s objection is as much a  denunciation of the theology behind 
modem literaiism as it is of the inadequacy of the interpretation of religious 
language literally. Thus, the objection is as much theological/moral as it is 
philosophical. For, according to McFague, the theology of literalism is
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mischievous in that, among other things, it has stifled the advancement of 
women. The idolater of religious language effectively blocks helpful change 
by locking in a  stifling vocabulary of religion. A new vocabulary, according to 
the idolater, is unacceptable. Most importantly, new understandings are 
banned as heretical. McFague opposes this position vigorously. The veracity 
and merit of her sentiment will be addressed only to the extent that her 
position bears upon the issue of meaningfulness.
Religious language is plagued with the problem of irrelevance when it 
becomes purely sentimental. It is irrelevant when it does not attempt to truly 
speak about the world in any meaningful way but is reduced to empty creedal 
statements or ritualistic utterances. “For many people, religious language, 
biblical language, has become, like a  creed repeated too many times, boring 
and repetitious. We are essentially indifferent to it”^  ^Few would disagree with 
this point Theists worry that few people take seriously the things that are said 
about God; this is precisely because many people do not see the traditional 
statements of Christianity as having any bearing on their iives. We live in an 
age, it would seem, when irrelevance is among the greatest of sins.
According to Gilbert Fell,
The old categories of oppositional thinking make religion Increasingly remote 
and irrelevant or, worse still, perpetuate the old worlds of elect and damned 
with all their attendant horrors and fail to do justice to the intricacies and 
complexities of genuine theological understanding.'^
Religious discourse, according to Fell and McFague, has become an
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outdated and inflexible mode of encountering the worid. The phiiosophicai 
problem is that religious language is often irrelevant because of its tendency 
toward equivodty. The inabiiity of theists to speak dearly of God to a secular 
audience pushes them to the periphery of an inteliectual worid that respects 
clarity and relevance.
A pluralistic perspective
One of the perceived needs for the metaphorical perspective is, 
according to McFague, a contemporary pluralism.^" She argues that, quite 
recently, we have become aware of the varied of perspectives available for 
interpretation. She daims, with some merit no doubt, that one’s perspective is 
not always freely chosen but may be the result of a  variety of temporal and 
cultural influences. “It is not only our time and place in history that influences 
our religious language, but also our dass, race, and sex; our nationality, 
education, and family background; our interests, prejudices and concerns.”'^  
McFague sees a metaphorical approach, one which embraces a variety of 
perspectives, as  a  better approach to religious language. Though McFague 
believes many traditional views are misguided, she cails for an indusive 
perspective which allows traditional understandings and embraces non- 
traditional interpretations, espedally feminist ones. The metaphorical 
perspective, one which embraces multiple metaphors and models and 
encourages a  continual flow of new comparisons, is best equipped to express
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"the richness and variety of the dhrine-human relationship.”^ * This perspective 
permits enormous linguistic freedom by encouraging the development of 
novel metaphors. Metaphor allows enormous freedom because of its inherent 
impropriety. "A metaphor is a word or phrase used inappropriately. It belongs 
property in one context but is being used in another the arm of the chair, war 
as a  chess game, God the father.”^  ^In respect to McFague’s insistence that a 
metaphorical theology is better equipped for pluralism, some might object 
that pluralism is not desirable in religious language as it may doud 
distinctions that have been carefully drawn; some Christian thinkers may 
even call it an invitation te heresy. Whatever the merits of linguistic pluralism 
in addressing God, McFague’s  broad concern with sodal issues is an 
obvious catalyst in her argument for a metaphorical perspective. This is not a 
dismissal of the pluralism which she recognizes and advocates, but it is a 
realization that her perspective is driven as much by cultural issues as 
philosophical/linguistic ones.
McFague believes the major contemporary problem of religious 
language te be that such language has traditionally exduded feminine 
characteristics of God and has provided fuel te sodetal gender inequities.
The hardened masculine metaphors for God (e.g. “Father,” “Son”) need not 
be replaced, but need to augment a variety of other metaphors that seek to 
describe God. Such issues are fasdnating, but not pertinent te the meaning 
issue. McFague’s  metaphorical theology does not posit that traditional
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metaphors are meaningless, but that they have hardened with the 
subsequent result that they are oppressive. Thus, for many proponents of 
metaphorical theology, the issue of reiigious ianguage is as much one of 
ethics as one of meaning.
Metaphor and noetic structures
One of the arguments given by advocates of a metaphoricai answer to 
the major questions of reiigious ianguage is that metaphor has epistemic 
primacy in the discussion. For, as they argue, metaphor iies at the base of 
the human noetic structure. McFague made the foliowing brash claim 
consistent with this idea:
Less obvious, but of paramount importance, is the fact that metaphorical 
thinking constitutes the basis of human thought and ianguage. From the time 
we are infants we construct our worid through metaphor; that is, just as 
young chiidren ieam the meaning of the coior red by finding the thread of 
similarity through many dissimilar objects (red ball, red apple, red cheeks), so 
we constantly ask when we do not know how to think about something.'”
Along these lines, proponents of metaphor are quick to recognize the
importance of metaphors/modeis to scientific inquiry. They note that scientific
language is “shot through with metaphor” and that
Metaphor is not an optional addition to univocal ianguage. Nor is it the key to 
creative advance that is then gradually replaced by univocal language. 
Rather, the two intertwine at every level of science. Metaphor is often used in 
models, that is “extended metaphors” that structure scientific understanding, 
testing and prediction.’®
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We are, according to many advocates of metaphor, metaphorical creatures. 
Stiver notes:
Metaphor sometimes says what has not been said before and cannot be said 
in any other way. In other words, metaphor is often irreducible to literal 
ianguage. indeed, in a brash suggestion, [Max] Black claimed that metaphor 
does not just help to discern reality, it creates reality.^
Some suggest that all language is the result of metaphor.^' Even the most 
basic words and phrases that we use are the product of hundreds and 
thousands of years of metaphor. Human language is a collection of layers of 
fossilized strata. Layers of words replaced by more layers. The process has 
produced the languages used today and continues to after and change 
language. The “leg” of a table or the “arm” of a  chair are not generally 
regarded as metaphorical, yet at some point were live metaphors descriptive 
of the objects they represent “Falling in love” is a  straightfonward expression 
and few notice that one does not literally “fall” in love, but that it Is a  hardened 
metaphor.
Centrality of metaphor in reiigious tradition
One of the values of a metaphorical perspective on problems of 
religious language is that it is consistent with both Westem and Eastern 
religious traditions which rely heavily on metaphor in their sacred texts. When 
attempting to speak of the divine, many religious traditions generate 
metaphorical language. The Bible is the Westem example of the dominance
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of metaphoricai language. With incredible flexibility, the Bible can use a 
metaphor to speak of God and his relationship to his people. The marriage 
metaphor Is used in both the Old and New Testaments with enormous 
variety. The minor prophets describe Israel’s idolatrous experiments with 
other ancient religions as "adultery.” God is described as a jealous husband 
longing for the affections of his unfaithfui wife. With its emphasis on intimacy 
and faithfulness, the sexual component of the metaphor is central to the 
metaphor that ancient Hebrews used. Thus, an idolatrous Israel is called a 
"harlot” and a  "prostitute,” neglecting the exclusive daim of her husband upon 
her affections.
The authors of the New Testament canon take up this metaphor and 
use it to elucidate the relationship of Christ with the church. He is a  husband 
and his church is his bride.
Without question, the Bible is a  book rich in metaphor, and it is a 
strength of the metaphorical perspective that it is a perspective consistent 
with language of the world’s important religious texts. Philosophers and 
theists need not discount traditional sacred texts when considering religious 
language as metaphor.
A metaphorical theology is not primarily concerned with questions of 
meaningful predication in religious discourse but primarily with an 
understanding of how ancient religious texts have taken shape in modem 
theological discussions. For McFague,
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The distinctive goal of a metaphorical theology is to assess the ways in which 
the fbundationai language of parables and Jesus as pwable—with their 
characteristics of openness, tension, relativity, indirection, and 
transformation—have been retained in the course of the various translation 
languages comprising theology.^
The theology of metaphor Is more concerned with developing new ways of 
speaking about God than assessing historical utterances of religionists. In 
this respect, it tends to be highly imaginative and flexible. New metaphors are 
continually under development, and old ones are buried under a heap of new 
metaphors.^ The metaphorical enterprise, then, is more one of theology than 
philosophy. It takes a greater interest in expressing truths^ '* about God 
through metaphor, than discerning questions of meaningfulness about God- 
talk. The problem of predicating attributes of God is not one of great concern 
to McFague or te other metaphorists. They are more concerned with the 
practice of theological reflection than with fundamental questions of the 
meaningfulness of religious utterances and the central problem of 
predication. This is not a comment with regard to the relative merit of a 
metaphorical perspective, just a recognition that such a  perspective is not 
primarily concerned with predication. It may be possible to give perspectives 
on predication through a metaphorical approach, but McFague’s approach 
does not adequately ground such a  search. Her approach treats metaphors 
like flexible scientific models which attempt to order theology rather than 
promote new discoveries.^
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Metaphor and analogy
McFague claims that metaphorical theology is essentially different 
frem the analogical perspective as advocated by Thomas. The metaphorical 
one avoids the "symbolicaT nature of tfie analogical perspective. While the 
analogical perspective may say that “Father” is symbolic of God, the 
metaphorical perspective boldly says that “God is Father.” This is not te daim 
a univocal relationship between metaphor and God, but to daim that there is 
a sense in which God both “is” and “is not” the metaphor. Thus, God is and is 
not “Father.” It is in this dual tension that the metaphor finds power.
There is, however, a deeper level to the semantics of metaphor It is not just 
that a judgment is being made that one subject is both like and uniike 
another, but the tension of duality in such a judgment is, as Ricoeur insists, 
between a literal or conventional interpretation which self-destructs and an 
extended, new interpretation which is recognized as plausible or possible.^
It is the insistence that “two active thoughts which remain in permanent 
tension or interaction with each other”^  which is essential te metaphor and to 
distinguishing it from Thomistic analogy. While the analogy “God is like a 
shepherd” posits that God shares certain similarities with a shepherd but 
really is not a  shepherd, the metaphor “God is a  shepherd” boldly claims that 
God both is, and is not, a  shepherd.^ The analogy compares characteristics; 
the metaphor claims an identity. The point of the metaphorist is that God is 
not merely like a  shepherd but that he is a sliepherd. Perhaps, however, the 
position of the metaphorist is not as distinct from that of analogy as McFague
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would hope.
Similarities with the Thomistic tradition
While McFague sees the metaphorical perspective as a break with 
Thomistic/Catholic tradition, at least three important similarities connect them. 
One important commonality is that both Thomas and McFague believe that 
the mind understands the world through metaphor. Metaphor is considered a 
mode of understanding by both McFague and Thomas. Therefore, according 
to S t Thomas,
When any name expresses such perfections along with a mode that is 
proper to a creature, it can be said of God only according to likeness and 
metaphor. According to metaphor, what belongs to one thing is transferred to 
another, as when we say that a man is a stone because of the hardness of 
his intellect^
In naming the properties of God, Thomas indicates that metaphor/analogy is 
the exclusive vehicle. McFague’s attempt to distance herself from Thomas 
tends to muddy the linguistic waters. Stiver made the following observations 
about the attempted distancing of the metaphorical perspective from the 
Thomistic view:
What muddies the picture is that those like Sallie McFague or Janet Soskice 
in the metaphorical tradition, largely rooted in literary tradition, can in direct 
opposition to the Thomistic tradition disparue analogy in relation to 
metaphor. For these writers, anaiogy remains closer to literal language; It Is 
basically a noncreative extension of meaning, as opposed to the genuine 
Innovation of metaphor. Since those In one tradition often speak critically of 
the terminology of another tradition. It Is no surprise that confusion often 
reigns.^
Additionally, McFague’s recognition of the need for many metaphors is
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consistent with the view advocated by Thomas in the Summa Contra 
Gentiles. According to Thomas, since we are unable to know God in a direct 
way, we are forced to consider the consequences of his actions. We know 
him from observing the effects of his actions upon the world. Because we see 
a great variety of effects which he has upon the worid, we must give him a 
variety of names. We must approach him with a  plurality of names or 
metaphors which reflects the diverse effects of his actions, which we observe 
in the world.®’
Perhaps the most significant similarity between McFague’s 
metaphorical theology and the Thomistic view of religious language is their 
common recognition that the problematic poles of religious language are, to 
use McFague’s  terminology, idolatry and irrelevance. For Thomas, this is the 
problem of univodty and equivodty. The first daims a  misguided intimacy 
with the divine, knowledge of his properties and language that speaks of God 
in a one-to-one descriptive way. Equivodty is ianguage that reaily says 
nothing. It speaks of God in a  nebulous linguistic doud that prohibits one from 
approaching any understanding of the divine.
The notable difference between McFague and Thomas on the 
question of speaking about God is that the lattor does seem to recognize that 
the fundamental problem of religious ianguage is the problem of predicating 
characteristics of God, a  problem which Thomas believes can be solved only 
by appealing to analogy—of which metaphor is a type. The problem that S t
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Thomas sees in regard to speaking of God is one of meaningfulness of 
discourse, not of finding more modem ways to speak of God. In this respect, 
Thomas is closer to the phiiosophicai problem than is McFague.
Inadequacies in McFague’s  position
A criticai analysis of McFague’s position reveals at least three 
important problems. They are certainly not all fatal, but all merit recognition 
and discussion.
Reiigious tradition, in McFague’s search for new and varied models 
through which to speak of God, she neglects the unique position of the Bible 
for Westem reiigious culture. While she does call the Bible th e  classic^ 
upon which other models must test themselves, she does not seem to 
appreciate the import of the exclusive centrality of the Bible in Westem 
reiigious discourse. McFague sees the Bible as a classic document of 
Christianity by McFague, but not as an the authority in reiigious discourse. In 
fact, the Bible, in some respects, perpetuates problems of rigidity in speaking 
of God. Perhaps, as she suggests, “One profound limitation of the Bible as 
classic text is that it suggests conservatism and the power of tradition.”^
One of the metaphors which McFague believes would be best 
disagreed is that of servant Such a metaphor is inappropriate to our time and 
culture.
At this point, however, metaphorical theology should step In. That Is to say, 
although the Inclusive way of the cross and die triumphaJIst way of
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resurrection were in Jesus’ time powerfully and appropriately contrasted by 
the metaphors of servant and king, they can be no longer. The language of 
servitude is no longer current, acceptable, or significant for expressing the 
distinctive and unconventionai kind of iove epitomized in the cross. Thisre 
are, I believe, other metaphors, such as those of mother, iover, and friend, 
that ^ r e s s  dimensions of that love more fully and appropriately for our
One must wonder what McFague means when she says that the 
model of servitude is not “acceptable.” In what sense is it unacceptable to say 
that Christ was a sen/ant? Who makes such decisions about which 
metaphors are acceptable and which are unacceptable given this 
metaphorical theology? Perhaps contemporary culture needs the model of 
Jesus as servant particularly because the culture does not understand the 
centrality in the Gospel of serving other people. Such questions seem 
theological in nature, but have import for a phiiosophicai examination of 
McFague’s theory. A theory which seeks to answer questions of the 
meaningfulness of religious language must be sensitive to historical 
examples of religious language, particularly those found in scripture. This is 
not to say that the language of servitude is right or wrong, but to say tfiat a 
departure from such language is a departure from the very tradition one 
wishes to vindicate and advocate.
According to McFague, a  significant departure from traditional 
metaphors is needed.^
The New Testament writings are foundational; they are classics; they are a 
beginning. But if we take seriously the parables of Jesus and Jesus as 
parable of God as our starting point and model, then we cannot say that the 
Bible is absolute or autiioritative in any sense except the way that a “classic” 
text is auteoritative: it continues to speak to us.^
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However, to root out Biblical metaphors and then to replace them with 
new ones seems an approach which most theists would resist For theists to 
replace Biblical metaphors with new “acceptable” ones is rather like asking an 
elderly lady to trade in her wedding ring for a  more beautiful new one. She is 
unlikely to make such a  trade. Obviously this is not a  fatal flaw in her 
approach, nor is it necessarily a  flaw at all. It is a  recognition that her 
approach may not be broadly acceptable. For non-theists the metaphorical 
perspective will not render religious language meaningful, especially since it 
disregards the problem of predicating about God. For the majority of Christian 
theists, it is an unacceptable move from the central text Roland Frye notes;
In Christianity, scriptural authority is recognized as basic to the teaching and 
practice of the whole church. As a twentieth century heir of the Reformed 
tradition, I do not always construe this authority in the same way as may a 
Roman Catholic theologian, or as did the great Reformers, but it operates for 
all of us.®^
Richard Swinburne made a  similar observation about the primacy of the Bible 
to the Christian tradition when he stated, “The Church which declared that 
creeds expressed the essence of revelation also declared at least from the 
second century onwards that Holy Scripture was the paramount vehicle of 
revelation.”^  Paul Minear objects most strongly to the idea of replacing Bible 
metaphors as he argued that “When we change what the Bible does say to 
what we think it should say, it becomes a dummy for our own thought—and 
no dummy exercises authority over the ventriloquist
87
Alston agrees that such an open-ended perspective which applauds 
linguistic creativity is problematic for theists since, "with sufficient ingenuity, 
virtually any metaphorical predicate can be elaborated in a  theologicaily 
plausible way.*"” Holding that old models need to be reconsidered, even 
replaced, and that creative new models are needed opens McFague’s 
position to the charge of theistic ventriloquism. Alston objects further that
What I take to be unacceptable theologically is not that God can 
metaphorically be said to be a spider or an apple, but that these statements 
are on a par with statements like "God created the heavens and the earth” 
and "God commanded us to love one another.”^ '
While novel similes might not be so objectionable to theists (e.g., God is like 
a  spider, or God is like a  big sister), direct identification of creative new 
metaphors might be unacceptable (e.g. God is a  spider, God is a big sister). 
The simile merely stipulates that God shares some things with the spider, not 
that God is a  spider.^
A metaphorical perspective which stresses the invention of new 
metaphors to solve old philosophical problems runs the risk of stripping an 
entire tradition of its relevance. Alston did not take on McFague directly, but 
his observation relates to the risk invoived with boldly applying new 
metaphors to God. Alston says,
I take it that these consequences are radically unacceptable to the "religious 
attitude* or, to speak less pretentiously, to the bulk of those in the 
mainstream of the Judeo-Christian tradition. A theology the propositions of 
which are logically compatible with anything else sayable of God, which can 
be true only in the same way virtually anything one might say of God is true, 
which have no determinate consequences eiteer for theory or for practice, so 
eviscerated a theology is stripped of virtually all its impact for human iife.^
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While not all metaphorists need be committed to each of Alston’s premises, 
his objection rings true with any metaphorist who fails to specify criteria for 
meaningful and meaningless metaphors.
As previously noted, traditional religious texts are filled with metaphor, 
and, consequently, a  metaphorical perspective need not discount these texts 
and certainly need not be offensive to traditional theists. While McFague may 
challenge specific metaphors in the Bible, she is right in considering 
metaphor as a  primary mode of God-taJk. Philosophically, metaphor seems 
an appropriate vehicle through which the problems of univodty and 
equivocation can be avoided; theologically, McFague’s  version of a 
metaphorical theology may not be acceptable to the mainstream Judeo- 
Christian tradition. Perhaps, for McFague, this is a  strength of her position, 
not a weakness.
Predication concerns. A major philosophical gap in McFague’s 
metaphoricai theology is that it neglects the problem of predication, focusing 
instead on the opaque concept of "relevance.” The focus of her metaphorical 
view is the workability of particular metaphors without directly considering the 
issue of meaningfulness common to any predicate characterizing God. The 
problem is critical because, whether a  particular metaphor appears relevant 
to a particular theist, is of little consequence if one cannot predicate any term 
or phrase, metaphorical or non-metaphorical, of God. In other words, making
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the statement “God is a  fortress’ Is of no value if there Is no account given for 
how the metaphor "fortress" describes God. Since it dearly does not describe 
God in a  literal one-to-one way, how then does it predicate? it may seem a 
helpful model for a  theist who is seeidng to understand God, yet be 
indefensible philosophically if there is no tenable account given of how the 
term describes. To stipulate that “it works” gives no answer to the question of 
linguistic meaningfulness. The non-theist may grant that the term Is relevant 
to a particular theist, but deny its meaningfulness. Many theists may not be 
concerned with the linguistic ambiguities in calling God a  fortress; perhaps it 
works within a  certain religious community or context However, phiiosophicai 
concerns about the meaningfuiness of predicating attributes of God are 
important if the theist intends to carry the ambiguity outside of her particular 
religious community. And, as history shows, the theist often is concerned with 
doing just that If this is true, then both theist and philosopher must once 
again concern themselves with the question of how predicates describe God. 
Perhaps an account of metaphor can be given that gives an adequate 
explanation. Shortly this text will argue that just such an account can be 
given. One answer that will be shown iies in the inherent narrative quality of 
theistic metaphors and ianguage about God.
A concluding thought on narrative. A third difficuity with McFague’s 
exposition of a  metaphorical theology is that it does not give adequate 
consideration to the language of parable and narrative, in her attempt to
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make all of religious ianguage metaphorical, she mistakenly identifies 
parable/narrative as simply "extended metaphor.” For example,
The parables, brief stories told in the secular language of Jesus’ time, are 
extended metaphors that say something about the unfamiliar, the "kingdom 
of God,” in terms of the familiar, a narrative or ordinary people doing ordinary 
things.**
There is truth in this statement in that parables are metaphorical in nature; 
that is, they do not speak of God iiterally but indirectly through a  story. 
However, it does not seem appropriate to label parables as simply big 
metaphors or collections of simpler metaphors. Rather, they are stories, 
perhaps even true ones, that ask the hearer to make the leap from the story 
to what the story suggests about the sacred. Very rarely does the story make 
direct statements about God; more often they contain no mention of God.
The hearer is forced te make the story into a metaphor by thinking that it in 
some way relates to God.
We have seen that metaphor, while helpful, does not offer a  genuine 
solution to the problem of predicating attributes of God. Foliowing this 
conclusion, we will examine narrative language as an answer to the problem 
of predication.
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Chapter 6: Narrative and predicative history
While McFague might be mistaken on several points, she is right to 
look to metaphorical language as the vehicle which offers the best hope for 
language about God. If the extremes of univocality and equivocality are to be 
avoided, the middle ground is metaphorical discourse. Metaphorical 
language, broadly construed, covers everything from analogy, to ornamental 
metaphors (metaphors as poetic decoration), to simiie, to narrative. While 
religionists, philosophers and scripture speak of God in many ways, the one 
that dominates is story/narrative. While "story” and "narrative” may be used 
interchangeably, staying with the rubric given this fype of language in our 
contemporary setting-"narrative”-  would be better.^
If the solution to the problem of predication lies in a particular genre of 
ianguage (e.g., metaphor, analogy), then narrative is the best candidate. This 
chapter wiil outline a  narrative response to the problem of predication. Then it 
will more generally discuss a narrative approach to religious discourse, 
concluding, however, that narrative is not a soiution to the probiem of 
predication. Narrative will be described as only moving the problem away 
from language and onto the hearer or reader. Thus, it substitutes a new 
problem for the old. Also, while narrative language has great communicative
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power in religious contexts, it provides no answer to the question of how 
predicates describe a  transcendent God. This chapter will offer a  detailed 
outline of a narrative view of religious discourse and, in particular, the 
response of a  narrative view to the probiem of predication. After finding this 
response to be inadequate, we shall examine a  novel view which answers 
the problem. This view will recognize the important role of predicative history- 
-the predicates common to a particular religious tradition-in speaking of God 
and will argue that within a particular predicative history, one can predicate 
attributes of God in a  meaningful way. Thus, the probiem of predication will 
be answered. Because of the centrality of narrative to the predicative history 
of Western Christianity, narrative will have an important place in future 
philosophical and theological discussions of God.
Defining narrative
Narratives are stories which may be either fictional or non-fictional. A 
narrative perspective observes that human dialogue has an essential "story­
like" nature. It presupposes that people are homo-narrans^ or story-telling 
creatures and that their discourse should be evaluated accordingly-as story. 
The definition of a  narrative is quite simply a story. A narrative is a 
combination of statements formed together in a  logical sequence to provide
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the hearer with a  ‘word-picture.’ When a  mother tells a bed-tlme story to her 
Infant, she Is most likely using a fictive narrative. When a  man recounts 
stories from his youth, he is using actual (true) narratives. A narrative may be 
either true, false, or a  little of both. A narrative perspective becomes a 
valuable way of looking at human discourse because human discourse has 
essential narrative elements. Thus, a  fruitful linguistic model for religion can 
be developed. ^
Narrative and metaphor
While narratives can be, and often are, a type of metaphorical 
language, they need not be. As previously noted, a narrative can be "true" In 
a straightforward sense as a report of an actual event A metaphor Is never 
true In this sense. One may properly presume Katherine Hepburn's 
autobiography (Me) to be true. It is true In that it recounts actual events that 
occurred from her childhood to adulthood. It contains bits of data which may 
be researched and proven to be accurate or inaccurate. At the same time, 
her autobiography is a narrative, it is a  story of her life. It Is not simply a 
collection of bits of data. It is a full-blown life story. While her autobiography 
contains metaphors, it is not strongly metaphorical. Her autobiography. Me, is 
quite straightforward and true in a  generally univocal sense.
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Narrative excesses
Sociologists and theologians who argue for a  narrative perspective are 
often prone to make sweeping generaiizations about narrative. As some 
proponents of a metaphorical approach daim that all human thought is 
metaphorical, some proponents of narrative make the same grandiose 
daims. * To what extent their daims are valid is not relevant to our search for 
an answer to the problem of predication.
Pluralism and narrative
The pluralism that McFague argues as a halimark of the metaphorical 
perspective is, according to narrativists, also a strength of a narrative 
approach, not only to language, but to reason as well. They argue that one of 
the real values of such a perspective is that it ailows common people to 
reason together without being "unreasonable." The intricades of formal logic 
and sdentific reasoning are not present, but the arguments may nonetheless 
be valid and provide good reasons for the audience. If humans are narrative 
creatures, then peopie have the capacity to reason in terms of narrative. One 
does not need to be an "expert" to provide good reasons through narrative, 
one only needs to be human. The narrative perspective provides a
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democratic common ground where common people and experts come 
together to discuss theological issues. The elitism of modem scientific 
approaches is replaced by a  more common-sense approach. The thought is 
that "all persons have the capacity to be rational in the narrative paradigm".^ 
Wesley Kort argued that this is the "commodious quality of narrative, the 
capacity, that is, of a  narrative to contain differing voices and discourses 
witlTOut needing to have one dominate the others.”^  This sentiment is one 
which, as we saw in the previous chapter, McFague holds to be an important 
reason to adopt a  metaphorical perspective.
Narrative and reason
Are not narratives, at least those that make or imply objective truth 
claims, held to a standard of reasonability? If they are, then the narrative 
seems to be adjudicated by something outside of itself, by its 
reasonableness. While the narrativists may be correct that humans often 
think and remember in terms of narrative, it does not seem to be the case 
that they always think in these terms. Straightforward propositional logic does 
not involve narrative. Thus, the sweeping daim that all human reason is 
narrative seems an exaggeration, if not straightforwardly mistaken.
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Narrative in the phiiosophicai tradition
For the philosophical community, narrative has proven to be one of the 
most resilient modes of phiiosophicai discourse. In answering Socrates’ 
question about the nature of virtue, Protagoras wonders about the mode 
through which he should argue his position.
Now shall I, as an old man speaking to his juniors, put my explanation 
in the form of a story, or give it as a reasoned argument?
Many of the audience answered that he should relate it in whichever 
form he pleased.
Then I think, he said, it will be pleasanter to tell you a story.^
Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley,® Hume,® Antony Rew,’° John Hick,"
Jonathan Bennett, and many others have chosen narrative as a  mode of
phiiosophicai discourse. While many eminent philosophers have chosen to
use narrative, there seems to be a  twentieth-century bias against the use of
fiction in philosophical argument Susan Anderson makes the following point
There is a feeling, I think, among the majority of philosophers, that 
philosophy is one thing and fiction something else, If Sartre hadn’t  in at least 
one work, written in an accepted philosophical style, I doubt that he would be 
considered a philosopher. (Camus generally isn’t, I believe, for this reason.) 
This bias against combining philosophy and fiction comes from the anedytic 
movement which has dominated twentieth century Anglo-American 
philosophical thought. According to the analytic method, one must express 
one’s views as dearly as possible, in an unemotional fashion, defending 
them with arguments, defining crudal terms, and considering all possible 
objections to one’s views. A work of fiction doesn’t seem to be the ideal 
medium through which to accomplish this.^ ^
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in spite of this, many analytic philosophers of the twentieth century 
have used narrative in their philosophical writings.'^ There are, according to 
Anderson, several reasons that philosophers have chosen to use narrative 
through which to argue their positions.
First narrative shows the relevance of philosophy to life. For example, 
an ethidst may show the relevance of utilitarianism and, at the same time, 
define utiiitarianism by telling a story about the making of utiiity judgments in 
everyday iife.
Second, communicating a philosophical idea through narrative means 
that the "reader must actively partidpate in the reasoning process.”^ '* To read 
a  work of fiction, at least a  good work of fiction, is to get invoived in the story. 
One begins to identify with the character and the situation in which the 
character finds himself. The reader begins to reason philosophically without 
realizing it In the end, it is possible that the condusion the writer wishes to 
promote has been drawn by the reader without any "straightforward” 
argument Jonathan Bennett refers to Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Rnn to 
make a  point about the human consdence and to show that "when someone 
believes himseif to be in a  moral temptation situation, it is possible for us to 
wish that he would do what he is indined to do rather than what he feels he 
should do.”^  ^Huck wants to help his slave friend Jim escape but feels that
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this Is wrong. He tries to suppress his desire to help Jim escape, but gives in
to the temptation of aiding his escape from slavery.
One needs to have a certain amount of distance from the agent to see that it 
is possible and a certain amount of sympathy for him to understand how he 
might not know that there is something wrong with the moral code he has 
accepted. A skillful writer of fiction can allow us to have access to a mind like 
Huck Finn's and see that his situation is indeed a possible one. And then a 
reflective person, reading this story, might even ask: Is it possible that some 
of my moral beliefs might be wrong, particularly those that repeatedly conflict 
with my sympathies?’®
Finally, "the emotional impact of a good work of fiction is likely to be 
greater than that of a  conventional philosophical work; so, although both may 
raise an Important question, the work of fiction is more likely to make us care 
about answering it”^  ^One particular example of this is the problem of evil 
presented as an argument against theism. While the argument may be 
outlined as a  syllogism, the impact of it is seen most clearly in specific 
cases—in stories. Rarely does one read a philosophical account of the 
problem of evil without that account providing a  narrative about a  specific 
event (e.g., earthquake, tornado, war), or a disease (e.g., leukemia, cancer) 
or some other story which seems contrary to the nature of a  loving, 
omnipotent God who is working in the world.
The question at hand is whether or not narrative can help answer the 
problem of predicating attributes of God. While it may not seem relevant to 
this question that philosophers use narrative, it has at least secondary
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importance. First, because the tradition of philosophy and the classic works 
of this discipline are laden with narrative, it would be inappropriate for a  
philosopher to charge that narrative language is Irrationar or Inappropriate” 
for scholarly dialogue. Narrative is clearly an appropriate vehicle for 
philosophical argumentation. This does not, however, give warrant to 
theologians who use narrative God-talk. The peculiar problem of predicating 
attributes of a transcendent being still presents itself uniquely to theologians, 
and not necessarily to philosophical discussions of a general nature.
Narrative and religious tradition
One of the objections against McFague’s view was that her reply 
might be seen as a threat, rather than a help, to the theistic community. This 
is not an objection to a  narrative perspective. Many of the important 
documents of Judeo-Christian history are uniquely recorded as narrative. For 
Christians, Jesus' use of parables and common stories shows the importance 
of narrative to scripture. At one point, the Gospel of Mark notes that "He did 
not speak to them without a  parable" (Mark 4:33). in fact, in the brief three- 
ear ministry of Jesus, forty different parables are recorded. Clearly, narrative 
was the primary mode of teaching about God and predicating characteristics 
of God.
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Narrative/Parable in the Teaching of Jesus
Lamp under a bowl (MatL 5:14-15; Mark 4:21-22; Luke 8:16,11:33)
Wise and foolish builders (Matt 7:24-27; Luke 6:47-49)
New doth on an old coat (Matt 9:16; Mark 2:21 ; Luke 5:36)
New wine In old wineskins (Matt 9:17; Mark 2:22; Luke 5:37-38)
Sower and the soils (Matt 13:3-8,18-33; Mark 4:3-8,14-20; Luke 8:5-8,11 - 
15)
Weeds (13:24-30, 36-43)
Mustard seed (Matt 13:31-32; Mark 4:30-32; Luke 13:18-19)
Yeast (Matt 13:33; Luke 13:20-21)
Hidden treasure (Matt 13:44)
Valuable pearl (Matt 13:45-46)
Net (Matt. 13:47-50)
Owner of a house (Matt 13:52)
Lost sheep (Matt 18:12-14; Luke 15:4-7)
Unmerciful servant (Matt 18:23-34)
Workers in the vineyard (Matt 20:1-16)
Two sons (Matt 21:28-32)
Tenants (Matt 21:33-44; Mark 12:1 -11 ; Luke 20:9-18)
Wedding banquet (Matt 22:2-14)
Fig tree (Matt 24:32-35; Mark 13:28-29; Luke 21:29-31)
Faithful and wise servant (Matt 24:45-51 ; Luke 12:42-48)
Ten virgins (Matt 25:1-13)
Talents (Matt 25:14-30; Luke 19:12-27)
Sheep and goats (Matt 25:31-46)
Growing seed (Mark 4:26-29)
Watchful servants (Mark 13:35-37; Luke 12:35-40)
Money lender (Luke 7:41 -43)
Good Samaritan ( Luke 10:30-37)
Friend in need (Luke 11:5-8)
Rich fool (Luke 12:16-21)
Unfruitful fig tree (Luke 13:6-9)
Lowest seat at the feast (Luke 14:7-14)
Great banquet (Luke 14:16-24)
Costof disdpleship (Luke 14:28-33)
Lost coin (Luke 15:8-10)
Lost son (Luke 15:11 -32)
Shrewd manager (Luke 16:1-8)
Rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31)
Master and his servant (Luke 17:7-10)
Persistent widow (Luke 8:2-8)
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Pharisee and tax collector (Luke 18:10-14)
Aside from the Importance of narrative In Scripture that can be dearly 
shown In fictive stories like the parables of Jesus or the Old Testament book 
Song of Solomon, other arguments can be advanced to the effect that much 
of religious language Is essentially narrative. The Bible In many respects Is a  
collection of narratives about a  certain group of people. From the narrative 
llfe-stories of Moses, David, Joshua, Esther and Daniel In the Old Testament 
to the narratives of the life of Jesus (In tfie Gospels) and his followers (In the 
book of Acts), the Bible Is permeated with narratives, both fictional and non- 
fictional. Narrative Is dominant In Western religious traditions.
Dan Stiver writes that narrative Is Indispensable to Christian theology. 
"The Identity of Jesus Christ and through him, of God, Is given to us In an 
Irredudble way In the Bible.. .  We cannot divorce Interest or faith from 
understanding the story In this case. Thus, theology Is rooted In narratives In 
an Indispensable way.”' .^
The narrative perspective Is useful for thelsts because It enables 
people to reasonably choose between competing accounts of experience. 
The Christian perspective holds that It Is acceptable and necessary to justify 
our values In experience. ^  People are able to judge according to the 
narratives of others and then according to their own experience which makes
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religious claims more reievant and compelling to the individual. Stories,
unlike straightfooArard statements, do not simply provide raw data to the
hearer, but they provide experience based data which can be accepted or
rejected based on the hearer's experience: they provide models for
interpreting experience. James Ross states that the idea that the experiential
nature of narrative predicates is integral to religious discourse.
The unbound description of the human condition in experience-predicates... 
is correiated with a reiigious stoiy, with story-predicates: creation, fall, exile, 
sin sickness, promise, covenant, violation, recovenant, incarnation, death, 
resurrection, redemption, salvation, repentance, metanoia, life, light, 
fulfillment and glory. The basic meaning patterns of the stoiy-predicates are 
established by the way they are used to explain and resolve the human 
condition through the telling of the religious story.^ ^
The experiential data come pre-packaged from the writer's experience and Is
translated into the life of the reader. Religious writings, at least in the Judeo-
Christian tradition, are comprehensively narrative in nature, and a
perspective on religious language which accepts this will prove beneficial.
Coste Didier argues for the importance of the narrative perspective.
Narratoiogy is not only one of the best ways of understanding the 
individual perception of mortality and its consequences. It is also an 
approach to the anthropological dimension of societies, institutions, 
religions, rites. ^
Kierkegaard is one of the great masters of the narrative form of 
religious argument His writings are full of beautiful fictional stories/parables 
and metaphors, and his recognition as a great writer is due in large part to his
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mastery of narrative. As Thomas Oden notes, "Kierkegaard had a 
metaphoric mind. He communicated, and apparently thought, in dramaturgic 
images. One has the impression that it would have been impossible for him 
to communicate meaningfully in any other way".^ It is improbable that 
Kierkegaard could have accomplished such an impact on the religious 
thinking of his day without the use of narrative. One reason for their 
importance to his success is that they demand the reader or hearer to 
participate. One of Kierkegaard’s parables that is a  good example of narrative 
in the Western Christian tradition is H ie  Rigorous Coachman.”
Once upon a time there was a rich man who ordered from 
abroad at a high price a pair of entirely faultless and high-bred horses 
which he desired to have for his own pleasure and for the pleasure of 
driving them himself. Then about a year or two elapsed. Anyone 
who previously had known these horses would not have been able to 
recognize them again. Their eyes had become dull and drowsy, their 
gait lacked style and decision, they couldnt endure anything, they 
couldn't hold out, they hardly could be driven four miles without 
having to stop on the way, sometimes tiiey came to a standstill as he 
sat for all he was worth attempting to drive them, besides they had 
acquired all sorts of vices and bad habits, and in spite of the fact that 
they of course got fodder in overabundance, they were falling off in 
flesh day by day. Then he had the King's coachman called. He 
drove them for a month-in the whole region there was not a pair of 
horses that held their heads so proudly, whose glance was so fiery, 
whose gait was so handsome, no other pair of horses that could hold 
out so long, though it were to trot for more than a score of miles at a 
stretch without stopping. How came this about? It is easy to see.
The owner, who without being a coachman pretended to be such, 
drove them in accordance with the horses' understanding of what it is 
to drive; the royai coachman drove them in accordance with the 
coachman's understanding of what it is to drive.
So it is with us men...l have often said to myself 
despondently, "Here are talents and powers and capacities enough- 
butthe coachman Is lacking." Through a long period of time, we
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men, from generation to generation, have been, if I may so say, 
driven (to stick to the figure) in accordance with the horses’ 
understanding of what it is to drive, we are directed, brought up, 
educated in accordance with man's conception of what it is to be a 
man...
Once it was different Once there was a time when it pieased 
the Deity (if I may venture to say so) to be Himself the coachman; 
and He drove the horses in accordance with the coachman's 
understanding of what it is to drive. Oh, what was a man not capable 
of at that time!
Kierkegaard is a  brilliant narrativist With great acumen he 
combines his craft of philosophy/theology with his skill as a  fiction 
writer. The result of the enterprise is a meaningful exhortation to a 
lackluster Christian community to be driven, once again, by the Master 
Coachman. The call Is to relinquish the reins, the individual control of 
one's life, and to put it in God’s  hands. Further, a  variety of other 
interpretations may be equally valid. The narrative applies equally well 
to the Church as a whole and to those who are not part of the circle of 
faith. All are called to achieve greatness by returning control to God. 
Note that even his summary paragraph at the end does not entirely 
spell out the narrative of the coachman. In fact, his summary is a 
continuation of the narrative language of the previous story. It leaves 
much to the individual reader. Yes, he straightforwardly identifies God 
as the coachman, but he chooses not to bring out specific application, 
leaving this to the reader. Thus, the reader must participate in the
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narrative In order to find its meaning. Janet Burroway responds that 
since the author “ietts] us use our senses and do our own generalizing 
and interpreting, we will be involved as participants in a  real way.”^  
The reader is called to predicate attributes of God and, thus, becomes 
a participant in the process of predication.
Religion makes demands on the iives of those who are inside a 
community of faith. Narratives are a  primary way that these demands 
are communicated to the constituent members of that community. Carl 
Vaught argues, "Story-telling ofton points to the discord of the human 
soul and to the development that leads beyond it It also suggests that 
wholeness sometimes comes, not as the result of human 
achievement but simply as a gift” He continues by noting, "The 
stories of our collective consciousness are richly human and contain 
expressive uses of language...  Both faith and philosophy should 
reflect the richness of experience to which stories can give us 
access."*
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Narrative and the problem of predication
Questions as tt) the truth or falsity of religious utterances are 
Interesting and can and should be the subject of debate among 
theologians. They are not, however, the primary questions with which 
philosophers wrestle. The problem of predication, developed In 
chapter four. Is the primary question for philosophers of religion who 
are concerned with the Issue of speaking about God. The concern Is 
one of meaningfulness. Can one make meaningful statements about a  
being one daims to be transcendent and radically different from 
anything the human creature can understand? What Is Interesting Is 
that the thelst and the non-thelst make essentially the same daim, that 
God Is not comprehensible. While the non-thelst, therefore, dedlnes to 
speak, the thelst speaks anyway. Can the thelst speak meaningfully in 
the face of the Incomprehensibility of God? Can the thelst predicate 
attributes of God?
One possible answer to these questions lies in narrative. Stiver 
dalms that “narrative Is extremely helpful in understanding meaning.”^  
For Stiver, the question Is not one of meaning. It Is one of truth. How
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do narratives convey truth about God?^ For Stiver, genuine questions 
about the meaningfulness of narrative do not exist Instead he 
questions the capacity of narrative to carry truth. It is enough to affirm 
that “religious language is communicable and understandable. Even if 
religious language possesses more indeterminate and figurative 
language, it is not so unlike other language, even scientific 
language.”®
Stiver is not trying to give a  comprehensive account of 
narrative, or a  philosophical analysis of narrative. He is providing a 
summary of various narrativists, and he does an adequate job on this 
score. The philosophically interesting question remains: How do 
narratives predicate? Two plausible responses might answer this 
question. One is that narratives do not directly predicate 
characteristics of God; they require participatory predication on the 
part of a hearer. The other answer, with the help of Max Black’s 
analysis of metaphor, lies in the complexity of meaning relationships 
suggested in narrative. As we shall see, neither of these answers is 
adequate. The first reply only trades a linguistic problem for an 
epistemic one. The second does not adequately answer our concern 
about the issue of predicating attributes of God.
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Narratives and predication
The first answer to the problem of predication is easy enough to 
arrive a t  A consideration of religious narratives will dearly yield the 
answer. Do the narratives which seek to describe God predicate of 
him? No doubt some narratives will appear to predicate qualities of 
God. Perhaps they do, but most often the narrative must be separated 
from commentary provided by the speaker. For example, Aesop’s 
fables often end with a  ‘moral’ of the story. The moral of the story Is 
not to be confused with the narrative itself. The moral of the story is a 
method of bringing out the intended lesson in a  dear and 
straightforward way; the moral is not to be confused with the fable 
itself. As with any metaphorical expression, both good and bad 
examples or adequate and inadequate examples may be found. The 
most recognized cases of narrative in Westem religious discourse are 
the parables of Jesus.^ Do his narratives predicate attributes of God?
Three parables which speak to the nature of God are located in 
the fifteenth chapter of the Gospel of Luke. In verses 4-6, Jesus tells a  
story about a man who loses a lamb. The rancher promptly leaves
111
ninety-nine of them in an open pasture and vigilantly pursues the lost 
lamb. When he finds the animal, he brings it home, calls to friends 
and neighbors, and hosts a  celebration.
In the second narrative (verses 8-9), Jesus talks about a 
woman who loses one of her ten silver coins. In order to recover the 
valuable coin, she quietly sweeps her floor while leaving the lamp unlit, 
hoping that she will hear the coin when the broom moves it across the 
hard floor. When she finds it, Jesus says, she will call her friends and 
neighbors together to celebrate.
In the third (verses 11 -32), and more famous, parable, Jesus 
tells the story of a  son who demands his inheritance from his still living 
father. His father gives him his inheritance and the young son embarks 
on a careless spending spree. With a famine coming on the land, he 
takes a job feeding pigs. Ending up penniless and starving, he longs 
just be able to eat some of the food that he gives to the pigs. After 
remembering the love and security that he once had in his father’s 
house, he devises and memorizes an apology to give to his dad. Then 
he travels home. While the youth is still some distance from his home, 
his father runs out to him, hugs him, places expensive clothes on him, 
puts a ring on his finger, and orders his servants to prepare a great
112
feast for his son who "was dead and is alive again” and "was lost and 
is found.”
The three parables follow the statement at the beginning of 
chapter fifteen, "Now the tax collectors and sinners were all gathering 
around to hear him. But the Pharisees and the teachers of the iaw 
muttered, this man weicomes sinners and eats with them (verses 1 - 
2).”" Immediately, Jesus tells the three stories. Those who read the 
stories understand that Jesus is answering the religious scholars by 
proclaiming that God deeply loves those who are lost He 
demonstrates this by seeking after them and rejoicing when they turn 
to him. The only mentioning of the reiigious scholars is in the final 
story. In the story, as the young prodigal returns home and the father 
prepares the feast, the older brother refuses to attend. He is angry that 
the wasteful younger brother is receiving such a  party. Here the 
religious scholars find themselves, as represented by the older 
brother, resenting the acceptance extended by God to those who are 
"sinful.” These three parables seem to predicate a variety of attributes 
to God. He is loving, seeking, hopeful and ready to celebrate.
However, the interpretation and predication is mine. The stories 
themselves not only do not predicate particular characteristics of God,
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they do not even mention God. The first one predicates attributes of a 
shepherd, the second of a  woman and the third of a  despondent 
father. The hearer is the one who predicates characteristics of God, 
otherwise the stories ascribe no explicit meaning to the nature of God.
A metaphor, while not univocal, does make a  direct predication 
of the subject God is lighf or a  “shepherd” or a  “rock.” Narrative is 
peculiar in that it does not directly predicate attributes of God, but 
demands the hearer to make the application/predication. Predication 
occurs, but not in the direct way of a univocal statement or of a 
metaphor.
The language of narrative does not by itself, carry the problem 
of predication. Because of this, the narrative can avoid the pitfalls of 
idolatry and irrelevance that for theologians, pose a  significant 
problem for religious utterances. As to the concern over predicating 
properties of God, narrative language does seem to dodge much of 
the problem by never directly predicating but leaving that task to the 
reader.
To offer only this response to the problem of predication would 
be insufficient For while the narrative may not directly predicate
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characteristics of God, dearly the narrative is intended to make some 
positive statement about the nature of God by way of the story. The 
hearer-reader is supposed to make some positive condusions about 
the nature of God in light of the narrative, even though the narrative 
may not dearly define each condusion to be drawn. Also, it seems 
dear that the hearer-reader is not free to draw just any condusion, or 
to make just any predication of God, after listening to the story. 
Apparently, the hearer will make appropriate and inappropriate 
predications of God in response to the story. For example, in the 
stories of Luke chapter 15, the narratives may not directly predicate, 
but they still involve predication or at least call for it
The main defidency in this reply is that it does not solve the 
problem of predication but pushes it back to a  different level. Instead 
of dealing with the problem of predication as a  linguistic issue, the 
hearer is left with the problem of predication. Epistemically, how does 
the hearer apply human terms (father,” “shephercf) to a  transcendent 
God? This is no less difficult than the linguistic problem. Thus, while 
the problem may no longer be a language problem, one problem is 
replaced with another and the problem of predication goes 
unanswered.
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Participatory predication. The particular way the narrative 
involves predication is a strength for both philosophers and theists.
The story involves predication by enlisting the participation of the 
hearer/reader. In a good work of fiction, the reader is drawn into the 
story. The reader begins to pull for the protagonist and identify with the 
situation that the hero faces. The reader imagines what it would be like 
if she were in similar circumstances and feels an emotional attachment 
to the ebb and flow of the story. The author of a good piece of fiction 
need never say things like: “John is the protagonist,” “He an honest 
man,” “He has a slight drinking problem,” “He cares about his wife and 
children.” Such dear and straightforward statements would not help 
the author convey her story but would interrupt the story and make the 
reader into less of a  participant When the reader gets into the story, 
the reader unknowingly predicates characteristics of John and reaches 
an understanding of him.
The religious narrative hopes to draw the hearer into drawing 
her own condusions. A good narrative does not go about the 
business of offering dear answers to theological questions; it most 
often raises those questions and thus confronts and challenges the 
hearer-reader. It does not create coherence as much as it destabilizes
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the world-view of the hearer. The narratives, as used in the New 
Testament are confrontational, revolutionary and discomfr)rting.
A narrative theology, rather than enlist in a campaign to protect 
theological interests, to ensure Christian coherence, or to produce 
certainty, will serve Instead to challenge and subvert Christian 
certainly, coherence, and Identity. A narrative theology will take 
narrative discourses as llmlnal places where, like Jacob with the night 
visitor at the Jabbok brook, one wrestles In order to obtain not only a 
name (an Identity, coherence, or a theology) but also, If not more so, 
an Injured hip, a chronic Instability.^ ^
The Parables of Jesus by Joachim Jeremias is a  lucid 
examination of the narratives of the New Testament He argues that 
the parables of the New Testament are intended to shock the hearer.^ 
They are also intended to bring judgment on the hearer.^
For theoiogians and philosophers, narrative is valuable in that it 
draws the hearer/reader into the argument Unable to stand by and 
cast argumentative stones at the thesis of the author, the narrative 
forces the hearer into the arena. A good narrative brings a  new 
understanding and, often, a  participation in the thesis of the author or 
speaker. It is doubtful that Jesus chose stories as a  way to avoid the 
sticky problem of predication: it is more likely that he chose them 
because they compelled the hearer to participate in them, and to 
confront and challenge the hearer. Straightforward propositional
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language would, quite probably, not have accomplished these 
objectives.
Thus, the first response to the problem of predication is 
genuine. Narratives do not, in fact, predicate attributes of God. 
instead, they involve predication by compeliing the hearer te predicate 
attributes of God. The problem is shifted to the hearer. This shift is 
intentionai on the part of the narrativist “is God really like the father in 
the stery?" “in what ways is God not iike the father?" “In what ways 
does God search for and pursue people?” “What would it mean for 
God to celebrate wfien someone repents?” These questions, each of 
which involve predicating attributes of God, are ones which the hearer 
must answer. Thus, as noted previously, the problem has not been 
solved.
Narrative and complexity of meaning relationships
The second way that narratives might be said te deal with the 
problem of predication is that they allow enormously complex meaning 
relationships. This is to say that, because narratives typically involve 
more complexity than a single metaphor, and often contain multiple
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metaphors within the story, they allow a  fuller broader interaction 
between language and subject
Max Black argued in Metaphor,^ and most recently in More 
about Metaphor,^ that an interaction view of metaphor solves certain 
problems. For narrative language, an interaction view enables a  better 
understanding of how narratives convey meaning, and consequently, 
how a  narrative undertakes to enable a  hearer to predicate.
Black summarized his view of metaphorical language in the 
following lengthy account^
1. A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, to be identified 
as the “primaiy subject and the “secondary one."
In Metaphor, I spoke instead of the “prindpaT and the 
“subsidiary” subjects. The duality of reference is marked by the 
contrast between the metaphorical statement’s focus (the word or 
words used nonllterally) and the surrounding literal frame.)
2. The secondary subject is to be regarded as a system rather than 
an individual thing.
Thus, I think of Wallace Steven’s remark “Society as a sea” 
as being not so much about the sea (considered as a thing) as about 
a system of relationships (the “implicative complex” discussed below) 
signaled by the presence of the word “sea” in the sentence in 
question. (In Metaphor, I proposed that the primary subject, also, be 
taken as a system. But it seems in retrospect needlessly paradoxical, 
though not plainly mistaken, to say that Stevens was viewing society, 
too, as a system of sodal relationships.) In retrospect, the intended 
emphasis upon “systems,” rather than upon “things” or “ideas” (as in 
Richards), looks like one of the chief novelties in the earlier study.
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3. The metaphorical utterance works by ‘projecting upon” the primaiy 
subject a set of ‘associated implications,” comprised in the impikative 
complex, that are predictable of the secondary subject
The label ‘implicative compleif is new. ‘Projection” is, of 
course, a metaphor that will need further discussion. In the earlier 
study, I spoke of a ‘system of associated commonplaces” (which 
later provoked some pointed criticisms by Paul Ricouer). My notion 
was that the secondary subject in a way partly depending upon the 
context of a metaphorical use, determines a set of what AriStotie 
called endoxa, current opinions shared by members of a certain 
speech community. But I also emphasized, as I should certainly wish 
to do now, that a metaphor producer may introduce a novel and 
nonplatitudinous ‘implication-complex.”
4. The maker of a metaphorical statement selects, emphasizes, 
suppresses, and organizes features of the primary subject by 
applying to it statements isomorphic with the members of the 
secondary subject’s implicative complex.
5. In the context of a particular metaphorical statement, the two 
subjects ‘interact” in the following ways: (a) the presence of the 
primary subject incites the hearer to select some of the secondary 
subject’s properties; and (b) invites him to construct a parallel 
implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; and (c) 
redprocaiiy induces parallel changes in the secondary subject
This may be considered a crux for the interaction view... 
Although I speak figuratively here of subjects interacting, such an 
outcome is of course produced in the minds of the speaker and 
hearer It is they who are led to engage in selecting, organizing, and 
projecting. I think of a metaphorical statement (even a weak one) as 
a verbal action essentially demanding uptake, a creative response 
from a competent reader, in Metaphor, I said—scandalizing some of 
my subsequent critics-that the imputed interaction involves ‘shifts in 
meaning of words belonging to the same family or system as the 
metaphorical expression”. I meant, of course, a shift in the speaker’s 
meaning-and the corresponding hearer’s meaning—what both of 
them understand by words, as used on the particular occasion.
Irreducibility of narratives, in explaining what metaphors do. 
Black holds that a  metaphor is not just an ornament of language. The
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metaphor does more than serve merely as a decorative substitute for 
some set of literal statements (the “substitution view“).^ Neither is the 
metaphor merely a  reducible analogy, comparisons between two 
objects which can be stated in literal language (the “comparison 
view“).”  For Black, a  metaphor creates an “implicative complex” at 
which the hearer arrives. The secondary subject (the metaphor) 
provides a system through which one perceives the primary subject 
Thus, if one says, “Tom is a  storm,” he is not making a  statement that 
can be reduced to a  series of literal statements; he is advancing a 
system of relationships that are prompted by “storm” and through 
which one understands Tom. As Black notes, the metaphor, even a 
poor one, demands a “creative response from a  competent reader.””  
The reader selects some properties of the secondary subject and 
projects them onto the primary subject As with narrative, the hearer is 
a participant While the speaker predicates the secondary subject onto 
the primary subject, the hearer is the one who selects which properties 
of the secondary subject to project and organizes her thinking about 
primary subject in terms of the secondary.
Wesley Kort notes a  variety of reasons for the massive 
implicative complex spawned by narrative language. “1) the place.
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environment and conditions of the narrative world (atmosphere), 2) 
people as individuals and in relationships (character), 3) actions and 
events in themselves and in their relations to one another (plot), and 4) 
the teller in the tale (tone).”^
Narratives do allow a  greater implicative complex. The hearer 
becomes involved in selecting from a multitude of properties those 
which he will predicate as attributes of God. While this may deepen 
the theological insight of religious discourse, involve the participant, 
and illuminate a difficult theological notion, it does not solve the 
problem of predication. In fact, the problem is made greater. As 
narrative multiplies the number of possible predicates which may be 
used to describe God, the problem of how a descriptive predicate 
actually works to characterize a  transcendent God becomes more 
severe. Neither the involvement of the participant through narrative 
discourse nor the greater implicative complex serve to answer the 
problem.
There are other difficulties with narrative discourse as well. 
Regarding the meaning issue in general, it is difficult to pin down 
specific meanings for many narratives. How far do the implicative 
complexes go? Are just any implicative complexes appropriate which
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may be drawn by a  hearer? As Stiver notes, "Narratives.. .  are not 
easy to pin down precisely or to evaluate exactly.'"'  ^He also notes that 
"The specter of relativism and fideism that hovers over many of these 
approaches is not easily exora'secT.'^ Narrative, as with other forms of 
metaphorical language, can open the door to seemingly limitless 
Interpretations and differing understandings.
Narrative is not a  failure as a  mode of religious discourse. As 
we have seen, it is an important mode of speaking about God and an 
immensely powerful mode for theists to employ. Yet, it does not 
answer the question of how predicates describe God.
The problem of predication solved
The great difficulty for theists and non-theists who wish to speak 
about God is, as illuminated in chapter four, the problem of predicating 
attributes of God in a  meaningful way. The problem of meaning is one of 
understanding just how these predicates can have a descriptive role 
concerning a God who transcends the world. While not recognizing this 
problem, theists and others have noticed that religious discourse is 
uniquely problematic. The verificationists, falsificationists, Thomists and
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modem metaphorists have argued that a  variefy of problems confront the 
language of religion. They may disagree as to the exact nature of the 
problem, but they have agreed that one exists.
The predication problem as defined earlier is not solved by analogy, 
metaphor, narrative, or an appeal to some other genre of discourse, but by 
recognizing that predicates which describe God occur within a  predicative 
history. This is to say that one does not predicate independently of a  religious 
tradition. However, statements about God occur within a  long predicative 
history, and one can meaningfully predicate qualities of tfie God wfio is 
illuminated in that history. For the thelst, the predicative history describes an 
existing divine being who possesses the variety of properties validated by 
that history. For the non-theist, the predicates meaningfully describe the God 
within a  particular predicative history, but this God does not exist The 
transcendent God is made linguistically accessible through particular religious 
traditions.
Consider the following:
S I . Predicates which are said to describe God occur in the context of a 
particular religious tradition (various Judeo-Christian traditions, Islam, etc.).
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When one predicates, he predicates attributes of the God revealed in 
a particular religious tradition. For her, this being does, or does not exist
52. Her predicates either correspond, or do not correspond, to the God 
revealed within that particular religious tradition. One need only examine the 
particular tradition to determine which is the case. While it remains an open 
question as to whether they describe a real God {Gi) they do predicate 
attributes of God as described in the particular tradition (GI).
53. Therefore, predicates can meaningfully describe God (GQ.
But are the above moves legitimate? It would seem that 81 can be 
taken without argument One would be hard pressed to find an example of a 
contemporary religious text that occurs outside a particular predicative history 
which is encapsulated in a  religious tradition.'” One would likewise have 
difficulty finding a theist who predicates attributes of God but does not 
predicate from a particular religious tradition, i.e. one who claims to stand 
outside of any religious tradition and speak of God. No doubt some attempt to 
do just that, to speak about God without any mooring to a  predicative history. 
Assuming that one is able to speak of God without doing so from a 
predicative history, one would again be confronted by the predication 
problem described earlier. Such a  person would not have access to the view 
outlined above. So, SI seems, with few exceptions, to be correct
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The latter part of S1 is simply a  recognition that laecause an agent 
predicates within a  given predicative history, the predicates she uses 
describe the God who is characterized in that history. Predicates like 
“Father,” “Son,” “Rock,” etc., come directly out of the Western Christian 
predicative history and are, tfierefore, quite common. To the extent that one's 
predicates are identified with descriptions common to a particular tradition, 
they have meaning. They describe Gt Within a  particular predicative history, 
Gf serves as a  reference point for those seeking to describe Gr. This is not to 
say that one can only repeat those predicates already mentioned within a  
tradition, but to say that the meaningfulness of predicates arises from their 
connection to that tradition. In the western Christian tradition, one may say 
“God is loving.” One might also say “God is not ioving.” Both of these 
sentences are meaningful because they predicate descriptively of the God 
revealed in the tradition. The sentences are meaningful given the history of 
Christian predication concerning God. The predicates take on a  meaning 
within that predicative history.
Consider this sentence; “X was a noble and just king.” Depending on 
what one inserts as X, the sentence may or may not be meaningful. If one 
asserts “Arthur was a noble and just king,” it is a  perfectly meaningful 
sentence. If one asserts “Druvex was a noble and just king,” meaningfulness
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is an open question. One doesn’t know If Druvex is a human, an object, a 
metaphysical property, a  grammatical rule of the Chinese language, or 
nothing at all. In the case of Druvex, it is not reasonable to label it as a  
meaningful sentence, at least not without more information. In the case of 
King Arthur, one is given a  predicative history through the legend of King 
Arthur through which to understand Arthur and speak descriptively of him. 
Given the novels written about King Arthur, the movies produced, eto., one 
may meaningfully predicate attributes of him.
Whether or not God is an existing being, one may predicate 
characteristics of God through the matrix of a predicative history. In the 
Christian tradition, a predicative history is given through the Bible as well as 
other literature. One may predicate attributes of Gr meaningfully through this 
tradition. It makes sense to describe God as "father" because that predicate 
is yielded through the predicative history of Christianity. One may likewise 
meaningfully describe God as "mother” or "spider” through the predicative 
history of Christianity. Perhaps these predicates are not true of Gt, but even 
so, they make sense through that history.
It is important to distinguish questions of meaningfulness and 
questions of truth. To say that within the Christian predicative history one may 
meaningfully assert either that "God is loving” or “God is not loving” is to
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make a  daim about meaning. It Is not the case that both of these assertions 
are true of Gt One may meaningfully predicate of the nation of Brazil both 
largeness” and "smallness.” They are both meaningful, but the latter Is false.
One might object that this Is not the way theists normally think of their 
predicates. Usually, when a  thelst utters a  statement like "God is loving,” he 
believes that he is speaking of Gr, not of Gt Whether or not a thelst 
recognizes that his predicates correspond to the God revealed In his 
predicative history is not relevant What is relevant Is that they (the 
descriptive predicates) are part of a  predicative history and that their 
meaningfulness arises In that those predicates describe Gt If SI Is true, then 
whether or not the theist recognizes Its veradty does not concern us. That 
their statements have meaning within the particular tradition Is enough. They 
are predicating attributes of Gr, for they believe that their tradition Is valid. 
They hold that the Grand Gtare Identical. They may or may not be right 
Whether Gr and Gt are Identical, or whether there Is a  Gr, may well be the 
great mystery which philosophers of religion face. This mystery is not of 
concern here.
The non-theist may meaningfully discuss the predicates as well, the 
difference being that for the non-theist the being Is not-existent For the non- 
theist Grand Gf are not Identical, for no Gr exists. Just as two people may
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discuss the political career of King Arthur and disagree as to whether or not 
he actually lived, a  theist and non-theist can meaningfully discuss God as 
revealed by a  particular predicative history. If Arthur did not exist, then he had 
and has no observable qualities. Even so, predicates may describe him 
because of tine literary history surrounding the legend of King Arthur. He is 
revealed in this history. In the case of King Arthur and the case of God, one 
can predicate meaningfully precisely because there exists a  predicative 
history exists wherein the predication occurs.
S2 concerns theologians and expositors of particular religious 
traditions. These are people who are not so much concerned with wfiether or 
not meaningful predication is possible (they assume that it is), but with the 
propriety or impropriety of specific predicates describing God given their 
religious tradition. A theist who believes that Grand Gf are identical will be 
concerned with adjudicating as to whether predicates are consistent with 
religious tradition and scripture, illuminate properties of God, or oppose the 
conception of God within that tradition.
Because Gf is accessible, it is possible to meaningfully attach 
predicates to Gt Thus, it is reasonable to believe S3. One might go even 
farther and suggest that given 81 and 82, it would be unreasonable to deny 
83. However, it would still be possible to daim that 83 would not be true
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concerning Gr. In this case, one may still engage in predicating attributes of 
Gt, but deny that Gr exists.
Conclusions
The logical positivists who argued for the verification criterion and later 
the falsification criterion incorrectly identified the problem of religious 
discourse, but were correct in sensing that there is something peculiar about 
such discourse. Concerning discourse about God, there is a  problem. The 
central difficulty with discourse about God is, as we have seen, the question 
of how predicates common to language can be used te describe God. How 
can these predicates describe a  being who is said te be wholly transcendent?
Thomas’s analogical position and the metaphorical position fail for a  
variety of reasons noted in chapters four and five. Both of these solutions 
sought an answer in looking to a  particular genre of language. Finally, we 
saw a  good candidate in narrative language. Such language allows more 
complex interaction between the predicate and object Also, such language is 
unique to Western religious traditions. However, it was seen that the narrative 
view also failed. None of these positions (analogy, metaphor or narrative) 
adequately addressed the problem of predication. The most hopeful one, 
narrative, only pushed the problem onte the listener.
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The problem of predication was not, however, without a solution. In 
the Christian tradition, the predicates which theists and non-theists use to 
describe God are descriptions that correspond to an entity spelled out by a 
long and detailed history. Theists do not, in fact, predicate descriptions of 
God Independently of a  religious tradition. They do predicate characteristics 
of the God they know through a  particular predicative history. While Gr may 
be unknown because of his transcendence, Gf is not unknown. Predicates 
describe this being in that they are validated or invalidated by that predicative 
history. If one can predicate meaningfully of Hamlet, Bilbo Baggins or King 
Arthur in this view, one can likewise predicate descriptions of Gt
There remain difficulties in speaking about God. Sometimes, language 
about God is hopelessly vague. At other points, such language may be, as 
McFague put it, Idolatrous" or “irrelevant” However, we saw that the main 
problem is that of predicating attributes of a transcendent God. This 
dissertation has responded to tfiat problem. To tfie extent that the problem of 
predication is tfie central problem regarding talk about God, this dissertation 
has demonstrated tfie possibility of speaking meaningfully about the divine.
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Notes
' “Story”, seems to cany the connotation of being fictional. Additionally, we 
often use “story” or “storyteller” to describe an account or individual we find to be 
untrustworthy. These seem to be good reasons to stick with the perhaps more bulky 
term “narrative.”
 ^Walter Fisher offers the illustration as humans as homo-narrans. “Narration 
as a Human Communication Paradigm,” Communication Monographs, 51 (1984), 
p.6. He draws heavily upon Burke’s definition of man as the "symbol-using animal.” 
Kenneth Burke, “Definition of Man* in Language as Symtnlic Action: Essays on life, 
literature, and Method, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp.3-24.
 ^Models are useful because they "give us something to think about when we 
do not know what to think.” McFague, Metaphoricai Theology, p.24. In this sense, 
they serve a useful heuristic function. She continues by arguing that "What we do 
not know, we must stimulate through models of what we do know.” Ibid., p.25.
One cannot approach religious discourse with a  mind unclouded by 
tradition and history. Models are part of our thinking whether we like it or not, or 
whether we choose one or not It is a dangerous thing to believe that one can read 
scripture or examine religious truth-daims without a model or a religious tradition. In 
speaking about my own religious tradition, the Church of Christ, Allen notes that "if 
we naively assume that we are fresh and pure, that we stand above worldly 
compromise and spiritual failure, that we espouse only the Truth and nothing but the 
Truth, then we lose the capacity for self-critidsm, for repentance, and thus for 
spiritual growth" (Leonard Allen, The Cruciform Church: Becoming a Cross-Shaped 
People In a Secular World. Abilene, TX: ACU Press, 1990, p.12).
For example, Roland Barthes daims that sentences are miniature 
narratives. In sentences, the nouns and verbs perform the same functions as 
charaders and actions. This seems to go too far. To daim that sentences are 
narratives is to over-broaden the narrative perspective and reduce its effectiveness 
in approaching genuine narratives. “An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of 
Literature,” trans. Lionel Duisit, in New Literary History 6 ,2 (Winter 1975), p.241.
 ^Fisher, “Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm,” p.10.
® Bound to Differ, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1992), p.129.
 ^Protagoras, 320c, translated by W.K.C. Guthrie.
'  Three Diaiogues between Hylas and Phitonous, first published in 1713.
" Diaiogues Concerning Matured Religion, first published in 1779.
Flew, Antony, Hare, R.M., and Mitchell, Basil, “Theology and Falsification,” 
University, 1950-51.
” Theology and Verification," Theology Today, XVII,1,1960.
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‘Philosophy and Fiction,* Metaphilosophy, Vol. 23, No.3, July 1992, p.203-
4.
to/tf., p.204.
Ibid., p.209.
Ibid., p. 205.
Ibid.
ibid., p.209.
"  Modem theologians dearly recognize the importance of narrative to the 
teachings of Jesus. McFague, Metaphorical Theology, p.17.
The Philosophy of Religious Language, p. 141.
^ Jeff Hobbs, The Narrative Paradigm and the Rational Justification of 
Values: Religious Argument in the Christian Tradition,” in Spheres of Argument ed. 
Bruce Gronbeck, (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Assodation, 1989), 
p.255.
Peter Lamarque argues that by telling and hearing stories, we are able to 
make sense of the world. The epistemological importance of this is that we "have no 
access to the world beyond the stories that we {eW." Narrative In Culture, (London: 
Routiedge, 1990), p.151. He may be overstating the daim a bit, but the point is that 
narratives enable humans to organize their beliefe and experiences and thus, 
interpret their environment
Experience should be viewed as a medium and never the norm of truth 
(borrowing from Tillich). Otherwise, we might all go off into our own solipsistic worlds 
with stories galore. Experience instructs belief-it does not create truth.
Portraying Analogy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
p.169.
^  Didier Coste, Narrative as Communication, (Minneapolis: UniversKy of 
Minnesota Press, 1989), p.11.
“ Thomas Oden, Parables of Kierkegaard, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978), p.ix.
This story appears in Kierkegaard's work For Self Examinatà)n and the 
version that is quoted is from Parables of Kierkegaard, pp.59-60.
I have at some places taken the liberty to omit material from the parables 
which is unnecessary for this study.
“  Writing Fiction, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), p.80.
“  “Faith and Philosophy,” The Monlst, 75,3, (1992), p.335.
“  The Philosophy of Religious Language, p.155.
“  Ibid.
^  Ibid., p.196.
“  This shall be taken as an uncontroversial observation on my part
Bound to Differ, P.134.
“  Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1972), p.30.
“  Ibid., p.29.
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^  "Metaphor,” in Models and Metaphors, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1962), pp.25-47.
”  "More about Metaphor,” In Perplexities, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1990), pp.47-76.
* Ibid., pp.59-60.
” More about Metaphor, p.58.
“  Ibid., p.58-9.
“  Ibid., p.60.
^  Bound to Differ, p.130.
The Phiiosophy of Reiigious Language, p. 199.
« Ibid., p.162.
^By "predicative history,” I mean that extensive bundle of predicates that are 
used to describe God within a particular religious tradition. In the Christian tradition, 
predicates like "father,” "shepherd,” and "fortress” (and many others) are commonly 
taken as descriptive of God. The borders of the set of predicates which compose the 
predicative history are not always, or perhaps ever, dear. There will be differences In 
the sets used by different Christian churches and between groups within those 
churches. Some predicates, like those listed above, will fall In the middle of the 
tradition, others (e.g. "mother”) will not be so dearly a part of a certain predicative 
history.
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